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Summary findings
Beck,  Demirgiuc-Kunt,  and Levine  assess  three  When initial  conditions  produced  an unfavorable
established  theories  about the historical  determinants  of  environment  for European  settlers,  colonialists  tended to
financial  development.  They also  propose an augmented  create institutions  designed  to extract resources
version of one of these theories.  expeditiously,  not to foster  long-run  prosperity.
The law and  finance view stresses  that different  legal  The authors' empirical  results  are most consistent  with
traditions  emphasize  to differing  degrees  the rights  of  theories  that stress  the role of legal tradition.  The results
individual  investors  relative  to the state,  which has  provide  qualified  support for the endowment  view.  The
important ramifications  for financial  development.  data are least consistent  with theories  that focus  on
The dynamic  law and  finance view augments  the law  specific  characteristics  of the political  structure,  although
and finance  view,  stressing  that legal  traditions  also differ  politics  can obviously  affect  the financial  sector.
in their ability  to adapt to changing  conditions.  In other words, legal  origin-whether a country  has a
The politics and  finance  view rejects  the central role of  British,  French, German,  or Scandinavian  legal
legal tradition,  stressing  instead  that political  factors  heritage-helps explain  the development  of the country's
shape financial  development.  financial  institutions  today, even  after other factors  are
The endowment  view argues  that the mortality  rates of  controlled  for. Countries  with a French  legal tradition
European  settlers as they colonized  various  parts of the  tend to have  weaker  financial  institutions,  while those
globe influenced  the institutions  they initially  created,  with common  law and German civil  laws  tend to have
which has had enduring  effects  on institutions  today.  stronger  financial  institutions.
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I. Introduction
A substantial  body of work suggests that well-functioning  financial  intermediaries  and markets  promote
long-run  economic  growth. Furthermore,  research shows  that particular  legal codes, contract enforcement
mechanisms,  and information  disclosure  systems influence  financial  development  and hence economic  growth.
These conclusions  emerge from cross-country  comparisons  [King  and Levine 1993a,b;  Levine and Zervos 1998;
LaPorta,  Lopez-de-Silanes,  and Shleifer  2000], firm-level studies  [Demirguc-Kunt  and Maksimovic  1998,
1999],  research  based on industry  level-data [Rajan  and Zingales 1998;  Wurgler  2000], time-series  research
[Neusser  and Kugler 1998; Rousseau  and Wachtel 1998,  2000], and econometric  investigations  that use panel
techniques [Beck,  Levine, and Loayza,  2000]. Thus, a large and diverse  empirical  literature supports  the view
that financial  systems  are instrumental  for economic  growth.
The view that financial  systems  exert a first-order  impact  on economic  growth raises a critical question:
How did some countries develop  well-functioning  financial  systems,  while others did not?  Why do some
countries have particular  laws and enforcement  mechanisms  that support  the operation  of free, competitive
financial  markets,  while others  do not? This paper uses formal econometrics  and historical case-studies  to
evaluate  alternative  theories conceming  the factors influencing  intemational  differences  in the development  of
financial  institutions. Moreover,  and at a more primitive level, we seek to better understand  the historical
factors influencing  intemational  differences  in the ability of private  agents to write contracts and make
transactions  confidently. For simplicity,  we use the terms "financial  development"  and "financial  institutions"
interchangeably  to refer to both particular  measures of financial  intermediary  and stock market  development  and
specific laws, enforcement  procedures,  and information  disclosure  systems that shape financial  transactions.
This  paper assesses three established  theories regarding  the historical determinants  of financial
development  and also proposes an augmented  version of one of these theories. Specifically,  we examine  the law
and finance  view, propose and assess an amended  version of the law and finance view called the "dynamic"  law
and finance  view, study the politics and finance view, and evaluate  the endowment  view of financial2
development.  There are clearly common  characteristics  among  these views. Nevertheless,  there are important
differences. We highlight  the distinctions  at the risk of oversimplifying  each theory.
The law andfinance theory stresses  that different  legal traditions  emphasize  -- to differing  degrees  --
the comparative  rights of individual  investors  vis-a-vis  the state, with important  ramifications  for financial
development  [LaPorta,  Lopez-de-Silanes,  Shleifer,  and Vishny (1997, 1998, 1999,  2000) henceforth  LLSV].
The law and finance theory contends that political  differences  - particularly  differences  associated  with the
relative  power of the monarch  and property holders - shaped  the formation  of three major legal traditions:  the
English common  law, the French  civil law, and the German civil law. According  to this view, the English
common  law evolved  to protect private  property owners  against the crown. This facilitated  the ability of private
property owners  to transact confidently,  with positive repercussions  on financial  development  [North and
Weingast, 1989]. In contrast,  the law and finance view notes that France  and Germany  did not have powerful
Parliaments. Indeed,  the codification  of the French  and German  civil codes in the lgth  century  under Napoleon
and Bismarck  solidified  State dominance  of the courts. Over time, State dominance  produced legal traditions
that focus  more on the power  of the State,  more on protecting  the politically  connected  heads of firms, and less
on the rights of individual  investors  [Mahoney,  2000]. According  to the law and finance view, these legal
traditions  spread throughout  the world  through conquest,  colonization,  and imitation. Thus, according to the law
and finance view, much of the intemational  differences  in financial  institutions  today can be traced back to the
prevailing  influences  of different legal traditions.
The dynamic  law and  finance view accepts the law and finance view, but also incorporates  the
comparative  law literature's emphasis  that legal traditions  differ in terms of their abilities to adapt to changing
conditions [Merryman,  1985;  Zweigert  and Kotz, 1998]. Differences  in adaptability  may have major
implications  for financial  development.  Legal traditions  that adapt quickly  to minimize  the gap between  the
needs of the economy  and the legal system's capabilities  will more effectively  foster financial  development  than
more rigid legal traditions. The comparative  law literature  suggests that the common  law is inherently  dynamic.
As judges respond  case-by-case  to the changing  needs of society,  there is a low probability  of a large gap
forming  between  the economy's needs and the law. In contrast,  the French  civil code was bom out of the3
Revolution  and had the utopian goals of creating a perfect, immutable  legal code. Thus, in theory, there is a
static nature  to the French  code. In practice,  however,  France  has adapted  to practical,  commercial  realities. In
transplanting  the formal French code to another  country, however,  it is critically  important  whether the country
adopts  the theoretical  - static - version,  or France's practical,  dynamic  version. If a country, for a variety  of
reasons,  obtains  the theoretical/static  version,  then there is a higher  probability  that large gaps will grow
between  legal capabilities  and commercial  needs than if the country  adopts the practical/dynamic  version of the
French  legal system. Critically,  Germany  explicitly  rejected the French approach. Building  on Savigny's vision
of legal science, Germany  sought to create a dynamic legal code. Importers  of the German code, therefore,  will
naturally  obtain a legal system specifically  designed  to evolve with changing  commercial  conditions. Thus, the
dynamic  law and finance view stresses  that common  law and German civil law countries will have a higher
probability  of creating a responsive  legal system  than a French  civil law country.
The politics  and finance  view stresses  that political factors  influence  the development  of institutions,
including  financial  institutions,  and argues  that legal influences  are of secondary  importance. The politics and
finance  theory emphasizes  that once a group gains power, it will shape policies and institutions  to its own
advantage  [Marx 1872;  North 1990;  Olson 1993]. Thus, if the elite see themselves  as being enriched  by free,
competitive  markets,  then they will put pressure  on the state to create laws and institutions  to stimulate financial
development. If - as seems  more common  historically  -- the aristocracy  feels threatened  by competitive
financial  markets,  there will be pressure  on the state to restrict private  transactions  and hence the operation  of
free markets  [Rajan and Zingales,  2000]. A centralized/powerful  state will be more responsive  to and efficient
at implementing  the interests  of the elite than a decentralized,  open, and competitive  political system  (Finer,
1997). According  to this view, differences  in state power combined  with the interests  of the elite to determine
financial  development  in England, France,  and Germany. The French  aristocracy  before the 1gth century  put
pressure  on the crown  to thwart competition. Later, the French  Revolution  toppled the Monarch  but created  a
powerful,  central  government  that systematically  strengthened  state power  and viewed unconstrained  financial
markets  as a threat.  Like France,  the unification  of Germany  under Bismarck  also fostered the creation of a
powerful  central  government  that cast a wary eye on financial  markets. England  was different. An influential4
Parliament  protected  the rights of individual  investors,  so that financial  markets flourished. Thus, while the law
may play a role, the politics and finance theory emphasizes  that centralized/powerful/closed  political systems
are more likely to impede financial  development  than diffuse/competitive/open  political systems.
The endowment  view emphasizes  the role of initial conditions  in shaping financial  institutions.
Acemoglu,  Johnson,  and Robinson  (2000, henceforth  AJR) note that Europeans  found a variety of conditions  in
the lands that they colonized. In some places, Europeans found  it difficult to settle and therefore focused  on
extracting  resources. In other  places, Europeans found  hospitable  conditions. They settled and established
institutions  to promote long-run  prosperity. Thus, the initial endowments  of land, climate,  and the disease
environment  profoundly  influenced colonization  strategies  and the types of institutions  that colonialists
constructed. These initial institutions  endure  and help explain cross-country  differences  in institutions  today.
To assess  the (i) law and finance,  (ii) dynamic  law and finance, (iii) politics and finance,  and (iv)
endowment  theories  of financial  development,  we use two methods. First, we briefly review the history of
European  legal and political systems and how these shaped  financial  development. We focus on the English,
French,  and German  legal traditions  because they have had the biggest influence  internationally. This review is
important  because  it (a) documents  how the formation  of legal, political,  and colonization  strategies  influenced
financial  systems,  (b) illustrates  the impact  of political forces and colonial strategies  on property  rights, markets,
and competition,  and (c) emphasizes  the evolutionary  nature of legal systems and thereby  helps distinguish  the
dynamic  law and finance view from the law and finance view.
The second  method for evaluating  the alternative  theories  of the development  of financial  institutions
employs  cross-country  regressions. We examine  whether cross-country  differences  in financial  institutions  are
accounted  for by cross-country  differences  in (1) legal tradition,  (2) political structures,  and (3) initial
endowments. To measure  cross-country  differences  in financial institutions,  we use measures  of (i) financial
intermediary  development,  (ii) equity  market  development,  (iii) laws governing  the rights of equity and debt
holders,  (iv) property  rights protection  and contract  enforcement,  (v) the quality of accounting  standards  and (vi)
the extent of public  ownership  in banks. We measure  these financial  institution  indicators  over the period 1975-
95.  To measure  legal tradition, we use the LLSV  (1999) indicators of whether the country  has a British, French,5
German,  or Scandinavian  legal tradition, which is based on the origins  of each country's Company/Commercial
law. To measure  initial political  structure,  we use measures  of the competitiveness  and openness  of the political
system  and the extent of checks and balances  that are computed  in 1800 or the first year of independence,  which
ever comes  later. To measure  initial  endowments,  we use the AJR  measure of the rate of settler mortality  as
European  settlers arrived  in various parts of the globe. We consider  the explanatory  variables  as reasonably
exogenous  for the period under investigation.
In conducting  the cross-country  comparisons,  we assess  the robustness  of the results  by controlling  for
other potential  influences  on the development  of financial  institutions. Specifically,  we include Africa and Latin
America  dummy  variables  to see if regional differences  dominate  the results. Furthermore,  we include a
measure  of trade openness,  to assess  whether openness  influences  institutional  development  and alters the
findings. We also test whether the length of time since  the country  became independent  influences  the
inferences  one draws on the competing  theories. Moreover,  we include measures of the national culture
(religious composition  and enthnolinguistic  diversity) to see whether accounting  for cultural  differences  alters
our findings. Also,  we include real GDP per capita to test whether the links between  financial  institutions  and
legal origin,  political structure,  and initial  endowments  are independent  of overall  economic  development.
Finally,  we also shed light on the transplant view. The transplant  view emphasizes  the way in which the law was
initially  transplanted  and received [Berkowitz,  Pistor, Richard 1999]. The transplant view stresses  that countries
that adapted  the transplanted  law to local conditions  and/or had a population  that was already familiar  with the
basic legal principles of the transplanted  law have a higher probability  of constructing  a successful  legal system
than countries  that received foreign law under alternative circumstances. Though a subjective,  ex post
classification,  we include  the transplant  effect indicator  to assess  robustness.
This paper makes four contributions. First, although  others have shown that legal tradition  is closely
associated  with financial  development,  this paper goes much farther in evaluating  the robustness  of these results.
Moreover,  this is the first paper to consider simultaneously  the law and finance,  politics and finance,  and
endowment  views  of financial  development. This "horserace"  is crucial to drawing accurate  inferences  about
the historical determinants  of financial  development. Second  and similarly,  AJR propose  the endowment  view6
of institutional  development  and show that settler mortality is negatively  associated  with institutional
development  today. They do not, however,  focus on financial  institutions  and thus they do not consider  the
broad range of alternative  explanations  of financial  development  that we use in our analysis. Third, while many
authors emphasize  the importance  of the structure  of the political  system, there is no cross-country  evidence  that
rigorously  examines  the links between  political structure  and financial  development. This is the first paper that
uses two new comprehensive  datasets  on political structure  to assess systematically  the relationship  between
political structure  and financial  development. Finally, we apply the comparative  law literature's emphasis  on
the evolutionary  nature  of the law to the study of the historical  determinants  of financial  development. By
highlighting  the comparative  ability of legal systems to adapt to changing  conditions,  we expand the law and
finance view's focus on the distinction  between civil and common  law systems  to also illuminate  (a) differences
between  the German and French  civil law systems  and (b) differences  between  the legal systems  operating  in
France and French  colonies. This allows  us to explain more completely  international  differences  in financial
development. Although  we do not use cross-country  regressions  to assess directly  the marginal contribution  of
the dynamic law and finance view, we (1) present regressions  that indirectly  emphasize  the value added of the
dynamic  law and finance view and (2) use the comparative  law literature  to highlight  the advantages  of
considering  the dynamic  nature of legal systems.
Before continuing  we want to emphasize  that we are not trying to distinguish  political from legal
influences  broadly  defined. It is practically  impossible  to separate  legal from political influences. In 1086,
William the Conqueror  ordered the recording  of the ownership  of all the land, livestock,  ploughs,  mills,
fishponds,  and manpower  in England. He undertook  this unprecedented  task for political reasons:  to assess the
strength of allies and opponents,  and to set taxes. The resultant Doomsday  Book - so termed  because these
property records  would stand until the Last Judgment  - defined  property  rights that limited the discretion  of
future kings  to expropriate  property from barons and thus had lasting political  repercussions. Similarly,
Byzantine  Emperor  Justinian  ordered  the compilation  of the Roman Civil Law about 534 A.D. Although
politically  motivated,  the Justinian  texts - when  they were discovered  five centuries  later in an Italian library  --
arguably  ignited  and indisputably  shaped  the formation of the world's most influential  legal traditions. More7
recently,  the "Declaration  of Independence"  and the "Rights of Man " trumpeted  the American  and French
revolutions. These documents  are simultaneously  legal and  political: they express  that men are created  equal
with certain  rights, and that elected  representatives  should secure these  rights.  '  The intellectual  foundations  of
these  revolutionary  documents  find their origins in secular law [Merryman,  1985,  p. 15]. Secular law in turn
finds its roots perhaps  as far back as Plato and Aristotle  but certainly  as a response  to the I  1th century Papal
Revolution  and the intensified development  of Canon Law [Berman, 1983,  p. 275]. Thus, defined broadly,
political  and legal influences  are inextricably  intertwined. Instead, this paper simply observes  that political
theories  emphasize  the importance  of very particular characteristics  of the political structure  and de-emphasize
the importance  of legal influences. We investigate  this empirically.
The paper is organized  as follows. Section  II develops  the law and finance and dynamic law and
finance theories. Section III presents the politics and finance theories. Section  IV discusses the endowment
view. Section  V presents  the data, and the results are given in Section  VI.  Section  VII concludes.
i.  The Law and Financial Development
This section describes  the law and finance and dynamic  law and finance  views. To do this, we sketch
the history of the civil and common  law traditions.  More specifically,  we analyze  the genesis,  formation,  and
maturation  of the French  civil law, the German civil law, and the British Common  law and how these different
approaches  to the law influence  the operation  of financial  institutions  today. In using the comparative  law
literature  to describe  the evolution  of different  legal traditions,  we naturally  emphasize  the dynamic,
evolutionary  nature of legal traditions  that forms  the basis of the dynamic  law and finance view.  2 By making
'  Nevertheless,  the  United  States  would  have  slavery  for  another  century,  and  France  would  have  Napoleon  as emperor
only  15  years  after  tossing  out King  Louis  XVI  in 1789.
2 Merryman  (1985,  p. 1) defines  a legal  system  as "... an operating  set of legal  institutions,  procedures,  and  rules."
Merryman  (1985,  p.2)  defines  a legal  tradition,  however,  as "...a set of deeply  rooted,  historically  conditioned  attitudes
about  the  nature  of law,  about  the role  of law  in  the society  and  the polity,  about  the proper  organization  and  operation  of a
legal  system,  and  about  the way  law  is or should  be made,  applied,  studied,  perfected,  and  taught." Although  legal
institutions,  procedures,  and  rules  reflect  the legal  tradition,  the legal  tradition  places  the legal  system  into a much  broader,
cultural  context.  Critically,  legal  tradition  speaks  to the evolution  of legal  systems.8
this amendment  to the law and finance view, we are able to explain cross-country  differences  in financial
institutions  more fully.
A. Legal Traditions
1. Civil law tradition: Historical  Background
In the sixth century in Constantinople,  Roman emperor  Justinian  had the Roman  law compiled  into what
is now variously  called the Corpus Juris Civilis,  the Justinian  texts, or the Roman civil  law.3'4 Hayek (1960, p.
166-167)  argues  that Justinian's code  has a very different  legal philosophy  from that of Roman law. First, while
the original  Roman  law places  the law above all individuals  and the state, the Justinian  code sets the prince
above the law. Second,  while laws in Rome evolved  case-by-case  through  the opinions  of the Jurisconsults,
Justinian's texts represented  a break; the texts centralized  power in the State and initiated an excessive
regulation  by statute. Justinian  forbade  - unsuccessfully  - commentaries  on the Corpus  Juris Civilis and
reference  to the primary Roman  works used to construct the Corpus  Juris Civilis,  and he burned  some of the
original Roman  documents. "He took the view that what was in his compilation  would  be adequate  for the
solution  of legal problems without  the aid of further interpretations  or commentary  by legal scholars."
[Merryman,  1985,  p.7] Although  Justinian conceived  of the Roman  civil law as indisputable  and inert, the
Roman  civil law continued  to evolve even in his day.
After being lost for centuries  with the fall of the Roman  Empire,  the Corpus  Juris Civilis  were
rediscovered  at the close of the 1I'h century. Soon, at Bologna and other Italian universities,  scholars  came to
study the Justinian  texts. Over the centuries,  the Glossators  and Commentators  produced  an immense  literature
on the Corpus  Juris Civilis. This literature  and the Justinian text "... became  the basis of a common  law of
Europe,  which is actually called the jus commune.... There was a common  body of law and writing about law, a
3 Note  Roman  civil  law  existed  for  about 1,000  years  before  the publication  of the Justinian  texts.  The start  of the Roman
civil  law  is frequently  dated  as 450  B.C.  when  the XII  Tables  of Rome  were  supposedly  published.  This  makes  the civil
law  tradition  about  1,500  years  older  than  the common  law  tradition.  The  start  of the common  law  tradition  is frequently
stated  as 1066  when  the Normans  won  at Hastings.
4 The  English  translation  of the Justinian  texts  is 4,503  pages  and  the texts  are composed  of four  parts:  the  Code  (12  books
of ordinances  and  decisions  by  Pre-Justinian  Roman  emperors),  the Novels  (Justinian's  laws),  the Institutes  (a short
textbook),  and  the Digest  (opinions  of  Roman  jurists  on legal  questions).9
common  legal language,  and a common  method of teaching and scholarship."  [Merryman,  p.9] The structure,
terminology,  and approach  of the Roman civil law heavily influenced  legal systems  throughout  Europe.
As in Justinian's time, the 12th  century  also saw the civil law tradition facing  tensions  between
theoretical  perfection  and practical realities. Indeed,  a defining  tenet of the civil law tradition  is the notion that
codification  can produce a rational, comprehensive  set of laws. "Justinian's Roman law was considered  to be an
ideal law, a written  embodiment  of reason,  ratio scripta, whose principles ought to govern  all legal regulation
everywhere..." [Berman, 1983,  p. 204].  In theory, the Roman  law "...  was treated as finished,  immutable,  to be
reinterpreted  but not to be changed." [Berman,  p. 205]. In practice,  however,  Europe's legal systems  faced
changing  commercial  relationships  and were therefore  heavily influenced  by commercial  law (Law Merchant),
which was a highly adaptable  and semi-private  law that affected commercial  interactions  throughout  medieval
Europe. In practice,  legal systems incorporated  Canon  and Secular  Law. In practice,  an essential  attribute  of
Europe's legal tradition is that it is dynamic,  unfinished,  and changing.
2. French  tradition
The Enlightenment's  impact on the French  Revolution  - its emphasis  on individualism,  rationalism,  and
nationalism  - "found legal expression  in the exaltation  of the role of the legislature  and consequent  reduction  ...
of the law-creating  role of the judiciary..." [Berman,  p. 32]. Prior to the Revolution  judges were part of the
aristocratic  class and supported  the landed aristocracy  against other  groups. While  the Crown  at times issued
progressive  reforms,  the courts "...refused  to apply the new laws, interpreted  them contrary  to their intent, or
hindered  the attempts  of officials  to administer  them." [Merryman,  p. 16] It is not surprising  then that the
French Revolution  strove  to eliminate  the role of the judiciary in making and interpreting  laws. The  judiciary
was to apply the law made by the legislature  and not to make law.
The codifiers  of the French  code in the first years of the 1 gth century - like Justinian's legal scholars
almost 1300  years earlier - sought to unify regional  legal systems  and also had the utopian goals of establishing10
a complete, coherent, unambiguous,  and everlasting legal code.5 The theory is that the legislature drafts laws
without gaps, so that judges  do not decide cases for which there is not legislative provision.  The theory is that
the legislature does not draft conflicting laws, so that judges  do not make law by choosing among conflicting
provisions.  The theory is that the code is clear, so that judges do not make law by giving practical meaning to
ambiguous statutes.  The theory is that the legislature provides comprehensive statutes, so that judges do not
make law by applying obscure provisions to cases.  Napoleon, like Justinian, sought a code that was so clear,
complete, and coherent that future commentaries  on it were unnecessary.  Indeed, when the first commentary
was published on the Code, Napoleon exclaimed, "My Code is lost."
While in theory the French Civil Code had a utopian, static nature, many of the drafters of the Code
were experienced practitioners who accurately predicted  that judges and other legal scholars would further
develop the Code [Merryman, p. 30-1].  The French legal tradition - which  in practice embodied the dynamic
influences of 2400 years of Roman, Canon, Merchant, and Secular Law - adapted to practical realities.  In
contrast to theory, the French courts have built an entire body of tort law on the basis of Article 1382 of the
Code Napoleon that states that one whose act injures another must compensate that person  [Merryman, p. 53]. In
contrast to the theory, the French Tribunal  of Cassation eventually - perhaps inevitably - not only indicated that
particular judicial  decisions were wrong, but also explained how to interpret the statute correctly [Merryman, p.
40].  In practice, the French legal tradition adapts and evolves as it confronts practical realities.
The Napoleonic  code also helped centralized power in the hands of the State (LLSV,  1998).  Although
the French Revolution threw out the Monarch, it maintained  a powerful, central  government. Indeed, with the
Napoleonic Code, the State became the source of all law.  Thus, codification centralized and expanded the
power of the state; it shifted power out of the hands of private property owners and into the hands of the State.
3. The German Civil Code and Comparisons with France
5 Voltaire  mocked  France's fragmented  legal system by writing, "When you travel in this kingdom  you change  legal
systems  as often  as you change horses." [Quoted  from Zweigert and Kotz, 1998,  p. 80]11
Besides the Enlightenment, the Protestant Reformation had a profound impact on legal philosophy  in
Germany. "Nature became property.  Economic relations became contract.  Conscience became will and intent."
[Berman,  1997, p. 30]  Thus, the secularization of the State sanctified property and contract.  By emphasizing
rational criticism, one influential product of the Enlightenment  was the belief in codification, i.e., the idea that
diverse, regionalized  legal systems can be replaced by a comprehensive, rational, and unified  legal code.  Efforts
at codification started in the  18"' century, but a unified legal code for German would have to wait for a unified
Germany and a decisive leader.6 Bismarck unified the country in 1871 and decided to place a high priority on
unifying the courts, civil procedure,  and bankruptcy law, and then in 1873 a decision was made to codify and
unify the whole of private law in Germany.
In contrast to the revolutionary zeal that shaped the Napoleonic Code, the German Civil Code of 1896
was historically oriented, scientific, and explicitly dynamic from its inception.  By the time Bismarck ordered
the construction of the German Civil Code, many of the weaknesses in French Code were apparent.  The
German legal scholar Karl von Savigny rejected the approach taken by the French.  Savigny argued that the law
of a people was a product of the history and culture of that people's  development [Merryman, p. 30].  Thus, to
properly code Gerrnan law, it was necessary to thoroughly study the historical development of existing German
law, including Roman civil law, old Germanic law, and recent commercial law.7 Only by systematically
assessing the historical context of the German legal system could legal scholars codify the inherent principles
and features of the German legal tradition [Merryman, p. 31].  Thus, unlike the French Code, the German Code
"was not intended to abolish prior law and substitute a new legal system; on the contrary, the idea was to codify
those principles of German law that would emerge from careful historical  study of the Gennan  legal system."
6 The Bavarian Chancellor  V. Kreittmayr  assembled  the Code Maximilianeu  Bavaricus  Civilis of 1756. Later Frederick  II
of Prussia  had the General  Land Law for the Prussian States assembled  in 1794. This heavily influenced  the (1) General
Code of Austria of 1811,  (2) the General  German Commercial  code of 1861,  and (3) the German Civil Code that officially
took effect on January 1, 1900.  [Zweigert  and Kotz, 1998,  p.135 - 142]
7There  was a countervailing  force. Some  followers  ofSavigny's Historical School of Law produced the Pandectist School
whose  main aim was the systematic  study of Roman material.  By studying  Roman law and then using logical, scientific
methods, the pandectists felt they could construct  a rational legal system. As put by Zweigert and Kotz (1998, p. 140),  "A
method of legal thinking which put 'conceptual  calculus' before the careful  observation  of social reality could only arise  in
a legal culture  which was  dominated by remote  and theorizing  professors  and which lacked an organized  and powerful class
of practicing  lawyers..."12
[Merryman,  p.3 1] Whereas  the Napoleonic  code was designed  to be comprehensively  immutable,  the
Burgerliches  Gesetzbuch  was designed  to be comprehensively  dynamic.
In comparing  the French and German  civil law traditions,  four points are worth emphasizing. First, they
both codify the law. There is a strong  belief that codification  can produce a rational  and complete  set of legal
rules. Second,  in both France and Germany,  the civil code supported  the unification  of diverse regional  laws
and the strengthening  of a nation. Third, although  they both seek  to limit the role of judges in making law, the
vehemence  of distrust of judges was much stronger  during the formative  stages of the Napoleonic  Code than
during the construction  of the German Civil Code. The German legal tradition sheds a much more favorable
light on judges and legal scholars  in interpreting  the law under changing  circumstances. For instance,  France
technically  denies  judicial review of legislative  actions, while Germany  formally recognizes  this power and
German  courts actively  exercise it [Glendon,  et al., 1982,  p.57]. Similarly,  in terms of adjudicating  disputes
involving  the government,  France's administrative  courts are within the executive  branch itself, rather  than in
the judicial branch. In Germany,  the judiciary handles these disputes. 8 Fourth, the German legal tradition  from
its inception  explicitly  rejected  the static ideals of the French  code. In creating  the German Civil Code, the
German view was that lawyers  would be needed, that they would engage in interpreting  and applying  the law,
and that the code they prepared  should be responsive [Glendon,  et al., 1982]. Thus, the German legal tradition
was  designed  to be more malleable -- more dynamic -- than the French  code.
8 The  high  courts  of France  and  German  also  reflect  these  differences.  The  Court  of Cassation  in  France  was  originally
viewed  as an institution  to assist  the legislature  and  notas a part  of the court  system.  It had  powers  to quash  decisions,  but
not  decide  cases.  The  judgments  of the  Court  of Cassation  are  meant  to  reflect  pure  logic;  they  are  not meant  to  reflect  the
balancing  of conflicts  between  statutes.  Thus,  decisions  are very  short,  do  not  refer  to  past  decisions,  and  are  viewed  as
impersonal  acts  of the state.  This  is different  from  the  Budesgerichtshof  in Germany,  where  it can  reverse,  remand,  modify,
or enter  final  judgment  on cases. Moreover,  the  balancing,  exercise  of discretion,  and  decision-making  process  all tend  to
be more  open  in Germany.  [See  Zweigert  and  Kotz,  1998,  264  and  Glendon,  et al., 1982,  p. 96-100,  123-133.]13
4. The Common  Law Tradition
English  legal scholars  date the origins of English  common  law as 1066,  the Norman  Conquest  at
Hastings. William  the Conqueror  allocated  land to solidify  support and prevent  barons from challenging  his
central authority  [Glendon,  Gordon, and Osakwe, 1982,  p. 145].9 The Doomsday  survey of all property in
England  in 1068  solidified  these  property rights and facilitated  tax collection. As William  centralized  power  at
Westminster,  he established  a centralized system  of royal courts. "Thus started a development  in England  which
in the following  centuries  led to the centralization  of justice and to the unification  of English  law." [Zweigert
and Kotz, 1998,  pp. 183] Importantly,  the existence  of this "common  law" of England  removed  one of the
central forces of codification  on the continent:  the desire to unify the law and the State.
Over the centuries,  the English  common  law evolved  based on the resolution  of specific  disputes and
grew increasingly  to stress the rights of private  property.  '°  As noted, landholding  rights in England  were
originally  based on William l's feudal system. Over time, however,  the courts developed  legal rules that treated
large estate holders as actual owners with substantial  property  rights and not as tenants of the king.  1'  Thus,
through  the courts,  "...  landowners  pried their land loose from the feudal system." [Mahoney,  2000,  p.6]
Indeed,  the common  law at the dawn of the 17th century  was principally  a law of private  property [e.g., Littleton,
1481,  and Coke, 16281.
The English  Common law assumed  its modem form in the tumultuous  16th and 1 7th centuries,  during  the
time of the great conflict  between  Parliament  and the English  kings who sought an absolute  monarchy. The
Crown attempted  to reassert feudal  prerogatives  to raise revenues. The kings also sold monopoly  rights to cope
with budgetary  shortfalls. Parliament  (composed  mostly of landowners  and wealthy merchants)  along with the
courts took the side of the property owners against  the Crown. The Crown  was unable to reassert  feudal
privileges. In the conflict  over monopolies  in 1624,  Chief Justice Coke supported the rights of individuals
9 Some  argue,  therefore,  that  the barons  of England  never  obtained  the power  of those  in France  and  Germany,  where  their
political  power  frequently  exceed  that  of the  Crown  [Zw-eigert  and  Kotz,  1998,  pp. 182-31.
° Although  the Roman  civil  law  influenced  legal  thinking  in  England  - indeed  it was  taught  at Oxford  as early  as the 12-
century,  the influence  of Roman  law  was  much  less  than  in  France  and  Gernany.14
against the arbitrary  ability of the Crown  to establish  monopolies. As he later wrote, "... if a grant  be made to
any man, to have the sole making of cards, or the sole dealing with any other trade, that grant  is against  the
liberty and freedom  of the subject,  that before did, or lawfully  might  have used that trade..." [Quoted  from
Hayek, 1960,  p. 168]. While King James I argued that royal prerogative  superceded  the common  law, the courts
asserted  that the law is king,  Lex, Rex.
12 The Stuarts  were thrown out in 1688.
In comparison  to France's legal history, the English  Common  law has typically  been viewed as a source
of liberty,  so that Common  law countries  tend to view the judiciary as a powerful  defender  of individual  rights.
As noted above, the English  courts were a liberalizing  force that helped dismantle  the feudal  system  and
protected  the rights of landowners  against the Crown. In contrast,  the French Revolution  targeted the judicial
aristocracy because judges had abused the law to support the ancien regime.  Thus, progressive  reform in France
necessitated  strict prohibitions  on judges making law. France sought legislative  supremacy  to secure liberty.  13
In contrast,  England  sought liberty  through an independent  and influential  judiciary.
While  legislation  is obviously  a source of law in common  law countries,  the common  law tradition - in
contrast  with the French  and German civil law traditions  -- is almost synonymous  with  judges having  broad
interpretational  powers,  with the courts molding  and creating law, and with  judicial review of executive
actions. 
14 As noted by Mahoney  (2000, p. 15), by the end of the 17th century,  judges in England  reviewed  the
actions of the executive  if there were purported  infringements  of individual  rights. In contrast,  France still has a
statute  that declares,  "It shall be a criminal  offence for the judges of the ordinary courts to interfere  in any
manner whatsoever  with the operation  of the admninistration,  nor shall they call administrators  to account  before
them in respect of the exercise  of their official functions."  (Quoted  from Mahoney,  2000, p.  15-16]. This is
" As Mahoney  (2000,  p. 6-7)  points  out,  landowners  frequently  served  as judges. Thus,  it is unsurprising  that  they
developed  a legal  system  that  treated  themselves  as  private  property  owners,  not tenants,  and  that  emphasized  the  rights  of
private  property  owners,  not  those  of the Crown.
Another  symbol  of the  victory  of the  Common  law  over  the Crown  -- and  the arbitrary  meddling  of Parliament  -- was
judicial  independence.  During  the middle  of the I  7"hcentury,  Parliament  gave  Common  law  judges  greater  independence
and  substantially  higher  salaries,  which  also  reduced  corruption.
13 Hayek  (1960)  argues  that  the French  philosophy  of liberty,  which  was  derived  from  Hobbes  and  Rousseau,  focuses  on the
state's  liberty  to seek  collective  ends. In contrast,  the English  view  of liberty  focuses  on the individual's  liberty  to seek  his
ends,  which  derives  more  directly  from  Locke  and  Hume.
14 For  a formal  model  that  studies  the conditions  of when  a legal  system  uses  "bright-line-rules"  vis-a-vis  a legal  system
that  grants  greater  discretion  to  judges,  see  Glaeser  and Shleifer  (2000).15
consistent  with the view that common  law countries  have a greater  tendency  to limit state power and support  the
property rights of individuals  than civil law countries.
Unlike  the French  civil law, the English  common  law tradition is inherently  dynamic.  The common
law evolves  as judges decide  new cases. The common  law is obsessed  with facts and deciding  concrete  cases.
Thus, the popular  dictum: "The life of the law has not been logic:  it has been experience."  [Zweigert  and Kotz,
1998,  pp. 181]. English  common  law tradition developed  the doctrine  of stare decisis,  to decide similar  cases
similarly. As noted above,  judges have played a larger  role over  time in civil law countries.  Nevertheless,  in
distinguishing  the civil and common  law traditions, legal scholars identify  the degree to which  judges
continually  - and as a matter of general practice  - shape the law as a key distinguishing  characteristic.
5. The Spread  of European  Legal Traditions  Around  the World
The English,  French, and German legal traditions  spread  throughout  the world through conquest,
colonization,  and imitation.  Napoleon  considered  his Code as a greater  achievement  than all his military
victories,  remarking  that "My true glory is not to have won 40 battles ...  Waterloo  will erase the memory  of so
many victories ... But what nothing  will destroy,  what will live  forever,  is my Civil Code." He made  it a
priority  to secure  the adoption  of the Code in all conquered  territories,  including  Italy, Poland,  the Low
Countries,  and the Habsburg  Empire. Also, France extended  her legal influence  to parts of the Near East,
Northern  and Sub-Saharan  Africa, Indochina,  Oceania, French  Guyana,  and the French Caribbean  islands  during
the colonial  era. Furthermore,  the French  Civil Code was a major influence  on the Portuguese  and Spanish  legal
systems,  which helped spread  the French  legal tradition to Central and South  America. The German Civil Code
was not imposed  but instead was studied  and used by other countries. It has exerted a big influence  on Austria
and Switzerland,  as well as China (and hence Taiwan), Czechoslovakia,  Greece, Hungary,  and Yugoslavia.
Also, the German  Civil Code heavily influenced  the Japanese Civil Code, which helped spread  the German  legal
tradition to Korea.  The Scandinavian  countries developed  their Civil Codes in the 1  7t"  and 1  8'h  centuries. These
countries  have remained  relatively  unaffected  by the far-reaching  influences  of the English, German and French16
legal traditions. While the Scandinavian  countries did not create a vast empire, England did. The English
common  law spread  through colonization  and conquest  to all corners of the world.
B. Law and Finance  View
In drawing  the connection  between  legal origin and financial  development,  LLSV's (1998) ignited  an
active literature. They argue that laws, enforcement  mechanisms,  and legal institutions  importantly  govern
financial  interactions. Since contractual  arrangements  form the basis of financial  activities, legal systems  that
protect investors  and enforce contracts  are likely to encourage  greater  financial  development  than legal systems
that do not support the rights of creditors  or equity holders or that ineffectively  enforce contracts.  Thus, laws and
enforcement  mechanisms  directly influence  the functioning  of financial  systems.
LLSV  (1998, 1999)  emphasize three points. First, in both France  and Germany,  the civil code supported
the unification  and strengthening  of a nation.  LLSV (1999, p. 231-2) state that, "[A] civil legal tradition,  then,
can be taken as a proxy for an intent to build institutions  to further  the power  of the State...." Thus, the finance
and law theory argues that the Civil law tradition tends to centralize  and intensify  state power and therefore
takes a more wary stance  toward  the development  of free financial  systems  than the English  common  law.
Second, since well-developed  financial  systems  may interfere  with political agendas,  powerful
governments  frequently  create laws, policies, and regulations  that limit private sector transactions  and hence
financial  development. Thus,  the Civil law provides  a ready vehicle for powerful  government's  to limit
financial  development.  In contrast,  the English  common  law has historically  stood on the side of private
property owners  and sometimes  against  the State. Thus, rather  than becoming a tool of the State,  the English
common  law became  a powerful  counterbalance  to the state that has promoted  private property  rights and hence
financial  development.
Third, in distinguishing  the German  and French  traditions, LLSV  (1999, p. 232) emphasize bureaucratic
efficiency. Citing  Ertman (1997) and Finer (1997), LLSV note that the German system  is more efficient  than
France's because  Germany  (as well as Scandinavia)  built a professional  bureaucracy  based on the military  and a
professional  civil service, while France's developed a patrimonial  bureaucracy  with strong  links to political17
elites. For this reason,  LLSV (1998) argue that German civil law countries  will tend to have better property
rights -- and hence better developed  financial  systems  -- than those with French  civil law systems.
C. Dynamic  Law and Finance View
The dynamic law and finance view emphasizes  that a crucial  distinguishing  characteristic  of legal
traditions  is their ability  to adapt to changing  conditions. To the extent  that a legal system  responds slowly,
large gaps will grow between  the commercial  and financial  arrangements  sought by society and the ability of the
legal system  to support  those requirements  effectively. Thus, more responsive  legal systems will be
correspondingly  more efficient  at supporting  financial  institutions  than more  rigid systems.' 5 16
In terms of explaining  the current level of development  of financial  institutions,  the dynamic  law and
finance view ranks legal traditions.  The common  law is inherently  dynamic  as it responds  case-by-case  to the
changing  needs of society.  This tends to limit the opportunities  for large gaps to grow  between  the demands  of
society  and the law.  Since laws must evolve efficiently  to support  financial  development,  the dynamic  law and
finance  view predicts that the common  law is particularly  effective  in supporting  financial  institutions.
Moreover,  the inherently  dynamic  nature  of the common  law implies  that countries  that received the common
law have received a legal tradition  that will more naturally adapt  to different  socioeconomic  conditions  and
more readily evolve with changing  commercial  requirements  than countries  with the French civil law. 17
'5 Indeed,  there  may  exist  "legal  development  traps." Initially  rigid  legal  systems  may  lack  the credibility,  skills,  and
flexibility  to respond  effectively  to  changing  conditions.  As  a consequence,  the legislature  will  have  a tendency  to  write
highly  specific  - "bright  line  laws"  - to limit  the role  of the courts.  "Ex  ante,  there  may  in  fact  be little  choice.  Once  this
pattem  of lawmaking  has  been  established,  however,  it is hard  to  change."  [Pistor,  Keinan,  Kleinheisterkamp,  and  West,
2000,  p. 62) Thus,  courts  will  not be challenged  to develop  legal  procedures  and  methods  to deal  with  emerging  conditions.
This  may  perpetuate  the inefficient  use  of bright  line  rules  and  produce  a legal  development  trap. See  Glaeser  and  Shleifer
(2000)  for  a model  of the evolution  of bright  line  rules  under  different  legal  origins.
16 Pistor,  Keinan,  Kleinheisterkamp,  and  West  (2000)  show  that  the critical  distinguishing  characteristic  of corporate  law
across  countries  is the evolution  of corporate  law. A century  ago,  countries  had similar  laws,  but they  have  followed  very
different  paths. Also,  see Keinan's  (2000)  study  on the evolution  of secured  transactions.
1  England  did  not  try to replace  Islamic,  Hindu,  or unwritten  African  law  and  the flexibility  of the Common  law  eased  its
transfer.  For  instance,  the English  courts  in India  were  instructed  to  apply  Islamic  or Hindu  law  depending  on  the faith  of
the parties  in cases  of inheritance,  marriage,  caste,  etc. In Africa,  judges  were  to apply  the English  law  only  to  the extent
that  local  circumstances  permitted  and  matters  were  to be decided  by equity  and  good  conscience  as rendered  necessary  by
local  circumstances  [Zweigert  and  Kotz,  1998,  p. 225-9]. While  somewhat  chaotic,  this  arguably  set  the stage  for  the
evolution  of an independent,  dynamic  common  law  in the post-colonial  era. In contrast,  the  French  strove  to incorporate18
France and French civil law countries  are different  from common  law countries  in their abilities  to adapt
and evolve. To the extent that the French  civil code is associated  with the rigid, utopian  approach of the French
Revolution,  there is a high probability  that the law will adapt slowly to changing socioeconomic  needs.  This
will have negative  implications  for the ability  of private  agents to contract and transact  confidently  and hence
limit financial  development. In practice,  France  adapted to practical  realities and its legal system  evolved
accordingly. Thus, there may not exist huge differences  between  England  and France in the ability of their legal
systems  to support  financial  transactions  today.
In transplanting  the Napoleonic  Code to other countries,  the dynamic  law and finance view argues  that it
is critically important  whether the country  adopts  the theoretical/static  version or the practical/dynamic  version.
If the country  adopts  the theoretical /static version,  then there is a higher probability  of suffering  with an under-
developed  financial  system than if the country  adopts  the practical/dynamic  version. The dynamic  law and
finance view is silent about the particular  country  characteristics  that determine  whether a French civil law
country  develops  the dynamic or static version. Berkowitz,  Pistor, and Richard  (1999) emphasize  the
difficulties  in transplanting  one country's legal system  to another country.  Instead,  the dynarnic  law and
finance view emphasizes  that the French  legal tradition  was created  in the hopes of being a perfect, immutable
legal system. Thus, there is an innately static character  to the Code. In developing  a more malleable,  practical
version, France  is the exception,  rather than the rule.  In a cross-section  of French  colonies, therefore,  there is a
high probability  that some of these countries adopted  the theoretical/static  version.' 8 Thus,  the dynamic  law and
finance view predicts that even though there might not exist much of a difference  between  France  and England,
there will be big differences  in financial  development  between English  conimon  law countries and French  civil
law countries.  19
the  Code  Civil  even  though  there  were  - and  remain  -- serious  conflicts  between  the Code  and  local  and  Islamic  laws
[Zweigert  and  Kotz,  1998,  p. 109-113].
a  In reviewing  recent  World  Bank  discussions  of  Francophone  Africa,  one  frequently  encounters  the lament  that  the laws
and  legal  texts  date  back  to the  colonial  period;  there  have  been  few  changes  and  existing  codes  do not even  reflect  changes
in  France's  laws  over  the last  forty  years.
19  Indeed,  some  even  argue  that  the Napoleonic  code  facilitated  the degradation  of property  rights  in  Africa.  Ayittey  (1992)
argues  that  it is only  in  the post-colonial  eras  with  the French  Civil  Code  that  African  states  have  had  the power  to
expropriate  property.  In contrast,  pre-colonial  African  leaders  did not  have  the power  to arbitrarily  expropriate  property.19
According to the dynamic law and finance view, Germany and German civil law countries fall closer to
common law countries than to countries that adopted the Napoleonic code.  From its inception, Gennany
rejected the Revolutionary philosophy that shaped the French civil code.  Germany explicitly saw its Code as
being dynamic. 20  Adopters of the German Code, however, received a legal system specifically designed to
change with evolving commercial  conditions.  Thus, the German civil law countries will have a higher
probability of creating a responsive legal system that supports financial markets than the cross-section of French
civil law countries, some of which adopted the theoretical/static  French code. 21
III. Political Structure and Financial Development
The politics and finance view of financial development predicts that political factors dominate legal
factors in determining financial development [North 1990; Olson 1993].  The political theories of North (1990)
and  Olson (1993) "...state,  roughly, that institutions and policies are shaped by those in power to stay in power
and amass resources."  [LLSV, 1999, p.227]  In applying this to financial institutions, Rajan and Zingales (1999,
2000) argue that the elite/powerful  may or may not favor financial development.  If self-made merchants form
2°  Specifically,  Harold  J. Berman  documents the impact of financial  and commercial  demands  on, first, the customary  law
of merchants  and, then much later, the formal scholarly  Roman  civil law taught in German  universities  during the 16th and
17th  centuries. Professor  Berman  details  numerous examples  in Contract and Property Law where the Merchant  Law
evolved  to support  a wide range of new contractual  obligations,  to support  leases, annuities,  rents, and to undue feudal
relationships and provide  the foundations  for private holdings in Germany. Only much later  were these  practical economic
and social realities  incorporated  into the formal/scholarly  Roman  civil law taught in the universities. Thus,  there was a
two-step  process: first from commercial and financial  needs to Merchant Law (which  governed commercial  transactions
when the formal  legal system  was lacking)  and then to the formal  legal system. Interestingly,  the English  common  law also
evolved  during this period to support  new financial  instruments  and the commercialization  of land. However, in England
the practical law is the Common law, so that unlike Germany,  new laws to support changing  commercial  and financial
needs were directly  incorporated  into  the formal Common law. Some of this discussion  is in Berman  (1997),  but most of it
is in drafts of two new chapters  that Professor  Berman is planning on adding to a second edition  of Law and Revolution:  A
History of the Western Legal Tradition that he was kind enough to share  with us.
21 There are other  key differences,  particularly  in terms of differences  between the German and French  legal approaches  to
debt. The German civil code  places greater emphasis on the explicit  "expression"  of the contract,  which implies  great
emphasis on the rights  of creditors relative  to debtors. The French  code places comparatively  greater  weight on "intent,"
which implies greater  emphasis  on the interests of debtors relative  to creditors  in France. For instance,  article 1  162  of the
French Code state that "In cases of doubt, one should  construe the contract  against the creditor and in favor  of the debtor."
[Quoted  from Zweigert  and Kotz, 1998,  p. 402]  Altematively,  some might argue that the success of German  civil law
countries  stems from another  reason. Countries  chose to follow the German civil code; it was not imposed  through
conquest  or colonization.20
the ruling elite,  then this augurs well for arrangements  that support  financial  development. If the landed
aristocracy  forms the elite, this suggests  a less favorable  climate for autonomous  financial  markets  that compete
with existing  interests. Moreover,  Rajan and  Zingales  (2000) accurately  stress that a time-invariant  factor, such
as legal origin,  will not explain  important  changes  in financial  development.
The politics and finance view emphasizes  that centralized/powerful  governments  tend to be
incompatible  with financial  development,  especially  in conjunction  with an elite threatened  by financial
development. The proper functioning  of financial  institutions  and markets  requires limitations  on government
discretion,  which might  be incompatible  with the ambitions  of a centralized  and powerful  state. Similarly,  a
powerful,  centralized  government  cannot credibly  commit  to not expropriate  and default  on claims,  which  is a
key component  of well functioning  financial  markets. A decentralized  political system,  on the other hand, may
offer a more conducive  environment  for financial  development.  Similarly,  in some political environments,
special interest  groups  may coerce  governments  to capture rents at the expense  of others [Becker 1983]. Thus,
governments  that reflect the interests  of powerful  special  interests  may be less likely to support  financial  market
development  than  countries  with less potent  special  interests. Similarly,  voting systems  that permit narrow
interests  to exert a disproportional  impact  on legislators  will hinder the enactment  of laws and regulations  that
foster competition  and financial  development  when financial  development  threatens  these narrow interest
groups. In sum, the politics and finance view suggests  that centralized,  closed  political systems  that face little
competition,  and political structures  without  many checks  on ruling  party discretion will tend to have more
poorly developed  financial  systems  than those countries  with more decentralized,  open, competitive
governments  that face checks  on legislative  and executive  power.
Rajan and Zingales  (1999) view the legal system  - the investor  protection  laws and enforcement
capabilities  - and the financial  system  as a direct consequence  of these political forces.  Most  early European
financial  centers,  such as Venice and Hamburg,  were small,  nominally  independent  political entities  with  checks
and balances  on the power of government  and relatively  broad political  participation. London  began to rise as a
financial  center in the 17'h century  when a strong  Parliament  checked  the power of the crown. Furthermore,  the
politics and finance  view stresses  that decentralized  political systems  resist the tendency  of centralized  system  to21
control markets  and thwart competition.  The European  countries  repressed  market  forces as response  to the
Great Depression,  whereas similar  attempts  in the U.K and the U.S.  failed. Finally,  electoral systems  that favor
narrow interest groups,  are less inclined  to financial  reform  programs,  as the example  of Japan in the 1990s
shows [Rosenbluth  and Thies, 2000]. The electoral  reform of 1994  eliminated  multi-member  districts  - where
legislators  could appeal  to special  interest groups  - in favor of single-seat  districts,  where candidates  have to
obtain a plurality of votes. It was only after this electoral  reform that the Japanese government  forced  banks to
bear a large burden  for the restructuring  of the Jusen, banks' investment  vehicles in the mortgage lending
markets,  and imposed  stricter  regulatory  norms.
One could argue that politics is inseparably  intertwined  with the evolution  of the legal tradition. Indeed,
since culture and historical  developments  have welded together  political  and legal forces,  we do not seek to
untangle the broad influences  of politics and law on financial  development. We do, however,  focus on some of
the sharper hypotheses  that emerge from the political economy  literature.
The political structure  variable  we use captures  the influences  of  (1) the competitiveness  of the political
system, (2) the extent  of checks  and balances  in the political  process, and (3) the importance  of special  interests
groups in the decision  making  process. As noted, the literature  suggests  that political  competition,  by
weakening  status quo interests  of those in power, will tend to foster the evolution  of arrangements  that support
financial  development. More competition  among competing  interest groups, legislative  oversight  of the
regulatory  process and greater  governmental  transparency  might increase  the likelihood  that the institutional
environment  will foster financial  development. Checks and balances  are also advanced  as an important
indicator. More checks  and balances  in the political process  involve a larger  number of political players,
representing  a wider array of political and economic  interests. This  makes policy changes more credible and
sustainable  with positive  ramifications  for market  development. The larger  the influence  of special  interest
groups on the legislative  process and the executive's decisions,  finally,  the lower is the predicted level of
financial development.  We recognize  that these  variables may be endogenously  determined  with financial
development. This should  bias the results toward  finding a positive  link between  political structure  and
financial  development.  Nevertheless,  we want to assess  whether these popular  political structure  variables  are22
able to account for cross-country  differences  in financial  development  after controlling  for legal origin.
Furthermore,  we control at least partly for this potential  endogeneity  of political structure  by using indicators  of
the initial political  structure  in 1800  or the year of independence,  whatever comes later. 22
IV. Endowment Effect
AJR (2000) argue that the degree to which Europeans  could settle in a land influenced  the choice  of
colonization  strategy  with long-lasting  implications  on institutions  and economic  development. We call their
approach  the endowment  view because  it focuses on the initial "endowments"  of land, climate, and disease
environment  faced  by colonialists. Engerman  and Sokoloff  (1997) also examine  the impact of initial
endowments  on the formation of institutions  that influence  economic  development. Here, however,  we describe
and examine  the endowment  view as explained  by AJR because  of data availability.
AJR's (2000) endowment  view is based on three building  blocks. First, influential  historians  argue that
different  types of colonization  strategies  created different  types of institutions  (see the citations in AJR 2000).
At the one extreme,  there were "settler colonies,"  where Europeans  settled  and attempted to replicate the life of
the home country. For example,  in the United States, Australia,  and New Zealand, settlers established
institutions  designed  to enforce  the rule of law, secure property  rights and assure long-run  prosperity. In areas
where there were many settlers,  European  powers created  institutions  to promote  economic  welfare. At the
other  extreme,  there were "extractive  states." The main purpose  of extractive states was to extract  as much from
the colony  as possible at the lowest cost. In extractive states,  colonialists  had little interest in establishing
institutions  to protect private  property and check the power of the state. Indeed, colonialists  established
authoritarian,  absolutist  regimes that facilitated  the extraction  of resources.  While useful for efficient  extraction,
the types of institutions  created in extractive  states were detrimental  to long-run  economic  development.
22 The politics  and  finance  view  also  stresses  that  the political  structure  of a country  might  also  influence  financial  structure.
Centralized  governments  might  favor  a bank-based  system  if it offers  more  opportunities  to control  the direction  of credit
flows  than  a market-based  system.  For  instance,  the militaristic  Japanese  government  of the 1  930s  suppressed  bond  and
stock  markets  and  forced  small  banks  to merge  with  larger  banks  in  an effort  to direct  credit  to  the military  industry.  We
examined  this  prediction  and  found  no link  between  political  structure  and  measures  of financial  structure.23
Second,  the feasibility  of settlement  materially  influenced  the colonization  strategy. In areas where the
"disease environment"  was favorable  to European  settlers, there was a much higher probability  that Europeans
would  establish  "settler colonies" and therefore  create institutions  to promote  long-run  economic  development.
For instance,  AJR note that the Pilgrims  decided  to settle in the American colonies  instead of Guyana  because  of
the much higher  mortality rates in Guyana. Thus, in places favorable  to Europeans,  they settled,  established
"Neo-Europes,"  and constructed  institutions  to foster long-run  economic  development. In contrast,  places  with
unfavorable  disease  environments  did not attract  as many settlers. Extractive  states  were more likely  to form in
these colonies. It is valuable to note that mortality  rates were startlingly  high in some places. In the first year of
the Sierra  Leone Company,  72 percent of the Europeans died. In the 1805  Mungo  park expedition in Gambia
and Niger, all of the Europeans  died before completing  the trip.  Curtin (1964, 1998)  documents  that the
European  press, especially  the British and French  newspapers,  published  colonial  mortality rates widely. Thus,
potential  settlers  had generally good information  in making decisions. Thus,  the initial "disease endowment"
helped determine  whether the colony was more likely to become a "settler colony" or an "extractive  state."
The third building  block of the endowment  view enunciated  by AJR is that early institutions  persist to
today [Engerman  and Sokoloff 1997;  Engerman,  Mariscal, and Sokoloff  1998;  Young 1994]. Many argue that
the initial institutions  that gave a high priority  to the rule of law, private  property,  and contract  enforcement  in
Australia,  Canada,  New Zealand, and the United States persist today. AJR note an important  reason why
institutions  tend to persist even after the European  colonialists  are removed. Once authoritarian  institutions  are
efficiently  extracting  resources  from the bulk of society in a colony,  the post-independent  rulers may tend to use
these institutions  to their own advantage  and profit. This was the case in Sierra Leone, Senegal,  and Congo as
noted by AJR. Latin America is similar. While Mexicans  gained independence  from European colonialists,  the
elite that assumed  power took advantage  of the existing institutions  to extract resources,  rather than creating
institutions  to protect  private property, contracts,  and foster broad-based  economic  development. Thus, the
initial institutions  created by European  colonialists  tend to be very durable.
Before continuing,  it is important  to recognize  that Engerman  and Sokoloff  (1997) rigorously  examine
how the natural  endowments  of the "new world" influenced  the development  of institutions. They find that24
agriculture  in southern  North America  and most of South  America enjoys economies  of scale and therefore
tends to promote  large plantations. Thus, they show that colonialists  in these areas  developed  long-lasting
institutions  to protect the few landowners  against the many peasants. In contrast,  northern  North  America's
agricultural  landscape  promoted smaller farms, so that more egalitarian  institutions  emerged  and persist. Our
primary  reason for focusing  on the AJR approach  is that they have assembled  data for a broad cross-section  of
countries.
V. Data 23
A. Financial  development  and specific laws
We use measures  of financial  development  over the 1975-95  period. The recent literature  has developed
a wide array of indicators  that proxy for the size and activity of financial  institutions  and markets.  This section
presents  our indicators  of financial  intermediary  and stock market  development. Critically,  we also examine
indicators  of the specific  laws governing  the legal protection  of shareholders  and creditors, the efficiency  of
contract enforcement,  and the level of accounting  standards.
Our preferred  measure of financial  intermediary  development  is PRIVATE  CREDIT,  which equals the
value of credits by financial  intermediaries  to the private sector divided  by GDP.  PRIVATE  CREDIT  is a
comparatively  comprehensive  measure of credit issuing intermediaries  since it includes  the credits of both
deposit  money and non-deposit  money  banks. Furthermore,  it excludes  credit to the public sector and cross
claims  of one group  of intermediaries  on another. It thus captures  fairly well the amount  of savings that is
channeled  through financial  intermediaries  to private  borrowers.
To test the robustness  of our results,  we use LIQUID  LIABILITIES,  which equals liquid liabilities  of
the financial  system  (currency plus demand  and interest-bearing  liabilities of banks and nonbank  financial
intermediaries)  divided by GDP. This is a typical  measure  of "financial  depth" and thus of the overall  size of
the financial  intermediary  sector [King  and Levine 1993a].
23 See  Data  Annex  for details.25
TURNOVER  is our primary measure  of stock market development. It is defined as total shares  traded
on the stock market  exchange  divided  by the total market  capitalization. It measures stock market  trading
relative to the size of the market.
To test the robustness  of our results,  we will use alternative  measures  of stock market development.
MARKET  CAPITALIZATION,  the value of listed  shares divided  by GDP, is a measure of the size of stock
markets  relative  to the economy.
Finally,  we use a measure of the public  ownership  of banks, which directly  reflects the state's role in
directing  the financial  system. PUBLIC  OWNERSHIP  is the percentage  of assets of the 10 largest banks in
each country  owned  by the government  as share of the total assets of these banks. This measure  is from LaPorta,
Lopez-de-Silanes  and Shleifer's (2000) insightful examination  of state ownership  of banks. A higher share of
government  ownership  in the banking sector allows  the government  to finance politically  beneficial  projects  and
control the economy  wide resource allocation.
Next we turn to four indicators  of the legal and regulatory  environment  in which financial
intermediaries  and markets function. Creditor  and shareholder  rights, the enforcement  of contracts,  protection  of
property rights and the accounting  standards  have been shown  to be important  determinants  of financial
development  in the recent literature [Levine, 1999);  Levine, Loayza and Beck, 2000].
OUTSIDER  RIGHTS  is an index of the degree to which  the legal codes of the country  protect  the
claims  of secured  creditors  and minority  shareholders.  It is defined  as the sum of CREDITOR,  an index of the
rights of secured  creditors  in the case of reorganization  or liquidation  of a company,  and ANTI-DIRECTOR,  an
index of the degree to which the legal codes of the country  protect  minority shareholder  rights. OUTSIDER
RIGHTS  ranges from zero to 10,  with higher values indicating  a better protection  of the rights of outside
investors. These data are from LLSV (1997)  and are available  for 49 countries. See, Black (2001) for a detailed
analysis of the legal and institutional  prerequisites  for well-functioning  securities  markets.
ACCOUNTING  is a measure  of accounting  standards, obtained  from the Center for International
Financial  Analysis  and Research (CIFAR).  This index, reaching from a maximum  of 90 to a minimum  of 0,
measures  the comprehensiveness  of companies'  balance  sheets and income statements.26
ENFORCE  is an indicator of the effectiveness  of the legal system  in enforcing  contracts  and is the
average of two indicators  obtained from LLSV (1998) - Rule of Law and Conrisk.  Rule of Law is an assessment
of the law and order tradition  of the country  that ranges from 10,  strong law and order, to 1, weak law and order.
This measure  was constructed  by International  Country  Risk Guide (ICRG)  and is an average over the period
1982-1995.  CONRISK,  also from LLSV (1998),  is an assessment  of the risk that a government  will - and
therefore  can - modify a contract after it has been signed.  Specifically,  "modification"  means repudiation,
postponement,  or reducing  the government's financial  obligation. CONRISK  ranges from 10, low  risk of
contract modification,  to 1, high risk of contract modification.  This measure  was constructed  by ICRG and is an
average  over the period 1982-1995.
PROPERTY  RIGHTS  is an index of the degree to which the legal system  protects  private property. The
maximum  value is five, while one indicates  the weakest property rights protection  (LLSV, 1999).
Table 1 presents  descriptive statistics  and correlations  for the financial  development  indicators,  with
data averaged  over 1975-95. Most indicators  of financial  development  are highly correlated  with each other.
Public ownership  of banks  is negatively  associated  with overall  financial  development. Protection  of outsider
rights is highly correlated  with  the development  of stock markets. Finally, good accounting  standards  and an
effective  legal system are positively  linked with both financial  intermediary  and stock market development.
B. Legal origin
In terms of measuring  legal origin, we use the measures  compiled  by LLSV  (1998) and extended  by
LLSV  (1999). They identify from which legal origin country  - England,  France, Germany,  or Scandinavia  -
each country  adopted  its Company  or Commercial  Law. We ignore socialist  law since we do not have
comparable  information  on financial  development  for these countries. Thus, we use dummy variables  in our
analyses  below. British legal origin takes on the value one if the country  adopted  its Company/Commercial  law
from England  and zero otherwise. French legal origin takes on the value one if the country obtained  its
Company/Commercial  laws from France and zero otherwise. We follow  a similar  pattern for German legal
origin, while Scandinavian legal origin is captured  in the constant.27
C Political structure
To test the hypothesis  that the structure  of the political  environment  influences  financial  development,
we use a wide range of measures  of the initial and current structure  of the political  system. Current  political
structure  variables  are from the Database  of Political  Institutions  (DPI) and cover the period 1975-1995  (Beck,
Clarke, Groff, Keefer, and Walsh, 2000). Initial political structure  variables  are from the Polity III dataset
(Gurr, Jaggers and Moore, 1990). The initial  political structure  variables  begin in 1800 or the first  year of
independence,  whichever  comes later. To control for potential  endogeneity  of the political system,  we focus our
attention  on the initial political structure  variables. We, however,  get very similar  results using current  political
structure  indicators (see Appendix,  which is available  on request).
We construct  a summary  indicator  of initial political structure. Specifically,  we construct a principal
component  indicator  based on four individual  indicators  of initial  political structure:  (1) Executive  Competition
is the extent to which executives  are chosen  through competitive  elections,  ranging  from zero to three, and with
higher values indicating  a higher degree of competitiveness;  (2) Executive  Openness  indicates  the degree to
which there are opportunities,  in principle,  for non-elites to attain executive  offices,  ranging form zero to four,
and higher values indicating  more opportunities;  (3) Nonelite indicates  the extent to which non-elites  are able to
access institutional  structures  for political expression,  ranging from zero to five, with higher values indicating  a
higher degree of competitiveness  and inclusion;  and (4) Autocracy  which is an indicator of the general closeness
of political  institutions,  ranging  from zero to ten, with higher values indicating  a more closed political  system.
Political  theories  suggest that Autocracy  should be negatively  correlated  with financial  development
and the other  three indicators  positively  correlated.  Thus, in constructing  the principal component  index, we put
a negative weight  on Autocracy  since  the politics and finance theory  outline above predicts  that Autocracy  is
negatively  correlated  with financial  development. The politics and finance  view predicts that this index will be
positively  correlated  with financial  development. Note, we have computed  all of the results  using the individual
indicators  of initial  (and current)  political structure  instead of the principal components  summary  indicator  and
obtain similar  results. These results are in the Appendix.28
D. Endowment
To test the endowment  view, we use the AJR measure  of settler  mortality,  which they construct from
research  conducted  by Curtin (1989, 1998)  and Gutierrez  (1996). Curtin (1989) focuses  on the mortality  and
disease  rates of European  soldiers in colonies  during the early nineteenth  century. The raw data come from
British,  French, and United States governments  during the period 1817-1848. The standard  measure was
annualized  deaths per thousand soldiers  with each death replaced with a new soldier. Curtin (1998) adds similar
data on soldier mortality  during the second  half of the nineteenth  century. Finally,  Gutierrez  (1996) uses
Vatican records  to construct estimates  of the mortality rates of bishops in Latin America  from 1604  to 1876.
Since some of these data overlap  with Curtin's separate estimates,  AJR confirms  the compatibility  of the two
data series before constructing  an overall  measure  of settler mortality for a large group  of countries.
E. Conditioning  Information
AFRICA  and LATIN AMERICA  represent dummy  variables for countries in sub-Saharan  Africa and
Latin America  respectively. Thus, Africa equals 1 if the country  is in sub-Saharan  and Africa and 0 otherwise.
Latin America  equals 1 if the country  is in Latin America  or the Caribbean  and 0 otherwise. We test the
robustness  of alternative  views using these  regional variables  because  cross-country  comparisons  frequently  find
that countries in sub-Saharan  Africa and Latin America  behave differently  for unexplained  reasons.
TRADE  equals the ratio of exports  plus imports  to Gross Domestic  Product (GDP). We include this
because open countries  may face greater  competition  and therefore  foster improvements  in institutions,
including  financial  institutions.
INDEPENDENCE  equals the fraction of years since 1776  that the country  has been independent. We
include  this since independent  countries  may more effectively  shape institutions,  policies, and regulations  to
promote  economic  success  than colonies.
CATHOLIC,  MUSLIM,  and OTHER  religions  equal the fraction  of the population for each country  that
is Catholic,  Muslim,  or of another  religion. We capture the protestant  share of the population  in the constant.
We include  this as a general indicator  of culture. Banfield (1958),  Weber (1958), Putnam  (1993), and Landes29
(1998) argue that some societies  form beliefs that are conducive  to economic  progress while others  do not.
Putnam  (1993, p. 107),  for instance,  contends  that historically  the Catholic Church  tended to foster "vertical
bonds of authority"  rather than "horizontal  bonds of fellowship." A lack of trust harms collective  actions, the
provision  of public  goods, and economic  growth. Similarly,  Landes  (1998) argues  that Catholic and Muslim
countries have developed  cultures  of xenophobia  and closed-mindedness.  Such cultural factors  restrict  the flow
of ideas and retard  the formation of growth enhancing  institutions  [see the discussion  in LSSV (1999, p. 229)1.
Furthermore,  Landes  (1998) argues  that Catholic and Muslim countries tend to develop  powerful  church/state
bonds to keep new ideas in check  and to maintain  control. Thus, cultural factors  - such as religion  - may
impede  the development  of institutions,  including  financial  institutions.
ETHNOLINGUISTIC  FRACTIONALIZATION  measures  the probability that two randomly selected
individuals  from a country  are from different  ethnolinguistic  groups. We include this variable  to assess whether
the links between  the development  of financial  institutions  and the legal origin,  political structure,  and settler
mortality  are robust to controlling for ethnic diversity.  LSSV (1999, p. 231) argue that "...political theories
predict  that, as ethnic  heterogeneity  increases,  governments  become more interventionist  and less efficient, and
the quality  of public  goods falls." Several  recent studies  have shown  that in highly ethnically  diverse  economies,
the group that comes to power tends to implement  policies that: (a) expropriate  as many resources  as possible
from the ethnic losers, (b) restrict  the rights of other groups,  and (c) prohibit the growth of industries  or sectors
that may weaken  the power  of the ruling group [Alesina,  Easterly,  and Baqir (1999) and Easterly  and Levine
(1997)]. When this view is applied to the financial  sector, the implications  are clear: greater  ethnic diversity
implies the adoption  of policies and institutions  that are focused  on maintaining  power and control and not
toward creating  an open and competitive  financial  system.
We also assess  whether controlling  for the "transplant  effect"  alters our conclusions  on the law and
finance and endowment  views. The transplant  view argues  that legal origin is not important  per se.  Rather,  the
transplant  view argues  that it is the way in which a country  receives  its legal system  that is important  and not the
particular legal system  that it is receiving. If a country  received its legal system  directly  from an origin country
and/or if the country  is very receptive to the legal system,  this promises  more success than if the country both30
received the legal system  indirectly and was unreceptive  to the legal system. According  to this view,
"receptive"  means  the country  adapted the transplanted  law to local conditions  and or the country  was already
familiar  with the basic legal principles of the transplanted  law. 24 Berkowitz,  Pistor, and Richard (1999) classify
countries  in terms of whether a country  is an origin country, whether  a country  received its legal system  directly
from an origin country,  and whether the country  received the law in a receptive manner (or was generally
unreceptive  to the law). Thus, TRANSPLANT  equals 0 if the country  is an origin country,  obtained  its law
directly,  or obtained  its law in a receptive  manner and I otherwise.
Finally,  we control for the average  level of Gross  Domestic  Product (GDP) per capita in the 1975-95
period to assess whether the law and finance, dynamic  law and finance, endowment,  and politics variables
explain financial  development  beyond their influence  on economic  development. We recognize  that there are
endogeneity  problems. Thus, we check  our results by using instrumental  variables  (IV) to extract  the exogenous
component  of GDP per capita. We draw the same  conclusions  from the IV regressions  as from the ordinary
least squares  regressions  reported  below. We provide  a sunmmary  of the IV regressions  in the appendix,
including  the instruments  and tests of the overidentifying  restrictions.
Table 2 presents summary  statistics. A few points are worth emphasizing. First, Settler  mortality  is
much higher in Africa  than in the rest of the world, while there is not a strong  link between  the legal origin
variables and the sub-Saharan  Africa dunmmy  variable. Second, trade openness is strongly  negatively  correlated
with French  legal origin countries  and strongly  positively correlated  with British legal origin countries. Third,
INDEPENDENCE  is negatively  and significantly  associated  with the British dummy  variable and Settler
Mortality,  but significantly  positively correlated  with German legal origin. Fourth, French  legal origin countries
tend to be Catholic,  while British legal origin countries  do not. Fifth, ethnic diversity  is much higher in British
legal origin countries  and countries  with high initial Settler Mortality,  while ethnic diversity  is much lower in
24 The  transplant  view  is a kindred  spirit  of the dynamic  law  and  finance  view. Both  clearly  reflect  the comparative  law
literature's  emphasis  that  a crucial  distinguishing  characteristic  of legal  systems  is the process  of lawmaking,  the ability  of
legal  systems  to adapt  to new  environments  and  to  evolve  efficiently  to support  emerging  commercial  and  financial
arrangements.  The  transplant  view  looks  to how  legal  systems  were  transplanted  from  one  country  to another  and
undertakes  a rich  study  of individual  country  circumstances.  The  transplant  view  de-emphasizes  legal  origins  and31
German  legal origin countries. Sixth,  those countries  that have  received  their laws in a generally  unreceptive
manner,  as captured  by the transplant  effect,  tend to be those countries  with high settler  mortality  rates.  Finally,
French  legal origin countries  and countries  with  high settler  mortality  rates tend to have centralized  political
structure. These correlations  suggest  that it is important  to control  for other alternative  influences  when
assessing  any particular  theory  of the development  of financial  institutions.
VI. Results
A  Legal Origin and Finance
The regressions  in Table  3 suggest  that the legal origin variables  explain  a significant  amount  of the
cross-country  variation  in financial  institutions,  even after controlling  for the logarithm  of real per capita GDP.
The legal origin variables  are significantly  different  from zero in 15 out of the 18 regressions  at the 5 percent
significance  level (Table  3a). German legal origin  countries  tend to have higher levels  of financial  intermediary
development  and stronger  contract enforcement  than British  or French  legal origin  countries. British  legal
origin countries  tend to have stronger  protection  of outsider  rights (the rights of shareholders  and creditors)  and
better accounting  standards  than French  and German  legal origin  countries. French  legal origin countries  tend to
have the lowest  levels  of the financial  institution  indicators  and significantly  lower levels  of private  property
rights protection  than British  and German legal origin countries.
The data continue  to indicate  an important  role for legal origin  in explaining  the development  of
financial  institutions  after including  dummy  variables  for sub-Saharan  Africa and Latin America.  While  there is
generally  a negative  relationship  between  the development  of financial  institutions  and both the sub-Saharan
Africa and Latin America  dummy  variables,  these  regional  dummy  variables  do not alter the findings  on the law
and finance  view significantly.  The legal origin variables  are significantly  different  from zero in 15 out of 18
regressions  in Table  3b at the five-  percent significance  level.  German  legal origin countries  tend to have
higher levels of financial  intermediary  development,  contract  enforcement,  and property  rights protection.
emphasizes  the process  of transplanting  legal  systems.  The  dynamic  law  and  finance  view  emphasizes  core  differences  in
legal  traditions  in  terns of  their  approach  to  lawmaking.32
British  legal origin  countries  have the strongest  outsider rights and accounting  standards  on average. Again,
French  legal origin  countries  tend to have the lowest  levels  of financial  institutional  development.
The data continue  to suggest  a strong  link between  financial  institution  development  and legal origin
when  controlling  for trade openness  and the fraction  of independent  years since 1776. Table 3c presents  18
regressions  of various combinations  of the logarithm  of real per capita GDP,  trade openness,  and
INDEPENDENCE  as control  variables. In 16  out of 18 regressions,  we reject the hypothesis  that the legal
origin  variables  enter with zero coefficients  at the five-  percent significance  level. Moreover,  we find  the same
pattem  of results  conceming  the British,  French, and German legal origin  countries. While trade openness  and
INDEPENDENCE  sometimes  enter significantly  and with the anticipated  sign, there is not a robust  link between
financial  institutional  development  and either trade or INDEPENDENCE.
Table  3d includes  religious  and ethnic  fractionalization  variables  in the regressions. Even  after
controlling  for religious  composition,  ethnic  diversity,  and the level of economic  development,  the legal origin
variables  are significantly  correlated  with property  rights protection,  contract  enforcement,  the protection  of
outside  investors,  and PRIVATE  CREDIT. Including  the religious  variables,  however,  weakens  the
relationships  between  legal origin and (i) LIQUID  LIABILITIES,  (ii) MARKET  CAPITALIZATION,  (iii)
TURNOVER,  and (iv) ACCOUNTING.  This  seems to be primarily  due to the close  correlation  between
Catholic  religion  and French  legal origin  (as noted earlier)  since  the religious  variables  generally  enter
insignificantly  and of the opposite  sign than that predicted  by some  theories. Ethnic  fractionalization  does  not
enter significantly  in most of the regressions.
Controlling  for the transplant  effect does not alter the strong  relationship  between  legal origin and
financial  institutional  development.  Although  the transplant  data substantially  reduces  the sample  (sometimes
by more  than 50 percent) and even after controlling  for the level of economic  development,  legal origin  remains
strongly  linked  with financial  development.  As Table 3e demonstrates,  legal origin enters significantly  in 13 out
of the 18 regressions  at the 5 percent significance  level and in 15 out of 18 at the 10 percent level. Differences
in legal origin importantly  explain  cross-country  variation  in financial  intermediary  development,  stock market
development,  the legal protection  of outside  investors,  and accounting  standards.33
Furthermore,  we do not find  much empirical  support  for the transplant  effect. The transplant  indicator
enters in only 8 out of the 18 financial  institution  regressions  significantly.  When controlling  for the overall
level of economic  development,  the transplant  effect is not significantly  related  to financial  intermediary
development,  stock market  liquidity,  the protection  of outsider  rights, contract  enforcement,  accounting
standards,  or property  rights  protection. The transplant  indicator  does not enjoy an independent  link with the
development  of financial  institutions  beyond  its association  with  economic  development.  25
B. Indirect  Evidencefor the Dynamic  Law and  Finance View
Thus  far, we have not distinguished  between  the law and finance and the dynamic  law and finance
views because  the legal origin dummy  variables  proxy for both. Now, we examine  the relationship  between
legal origin and the development  of financial  institutions  after controlling  for the full array  of initial and current
political  structure  indicators  listed  above. Differences  in legal origin significantly  explain financial  intermediary
development,  stock market  development,  the legal rights of outside  investors,  accounting  standards,  contract
enforcement  efficiency,  and the protection  of property  rights after controlling  for overall  economic  development
and the battery  of measures  of the initial  political  environment  (Table  3f). Also,  controlling  for current  political
structure  does  not change  these findings  (Table  3g). In turn, the political  structure  variables  rarely enter  the
regressions  significantly.  Thus,  the strong  link  between  legal origin and measures  of the development  of
financial  institutions  is robust to indicators  of political  structure.
These results  provide  indirect  support  for the dynamic  law and finance  view. The law and finance  view
argues  that the civil law tradition  is intimately  linked  with  the creation  of centralized,  powerful,  closed political
systems  that tend to limit the development  of free, competitive  markets. The observation  that legal origin
explains  financial  development  when controlling  for the centralization,  power, and openness  of the political
system  suggests  that  legal origin captures  something  else besides  the centralization,  power, and openness  of the
State. The dynamic  law and finance  view argues  that this "something  else" is the degree  to which  the legal
system  evolves:  legal traditions  differ in terms of their ability to evolve to support  changing  commercial  and
25 As  noted  above,  we  verify  the  regression  results  with  GDP  per  capita  using  instrumental  variables  for  GDP  per  capita  and34
financial  arrangements.  We call this indirect  cross-country  evidence  in support  of the dynamic  law and finance
view because  we do not have a direct measure  of legal system  adaptability.
In sum, cross-country  differences  in legal origin  help explain  cross-country  differences  in the
development  of financial  institutions.  We find that German  legal origin countries  tend to have  higher levels  of
financial  intermediary  development,  contract  enforcement,  and property  rights protection. On average,  British
legal origin countries  have the strongest  laws in terms of protecting  the rights of outside  investors  and they also
have  the strongest  accounting  standards. French  legal origin countries  tend to have the lowest  levels  of
development  of financial  institutions. We find  that these findings  hold - with the specific  exceptions  noted
above  - even after controlling  for the level of economic  development,  regional  dummy  variables,  trade
openness,  the fraction  of years the country  has been independent  since 1776,  ethnic diversity,  religious
composition,  the transplant  effect,  and many measures  of initial  and current  political  structure. The main
contributions  of this section are (1) in assessing  the robustness  of the law and finance  view to alterations  in the
conditioning  information  set and (2) in showing  that there is a strong  link between  legal origin and financial
development  after controlling  for the degree  to which  the government  is centralized,  closed,  and uncompetitive.
This  provides  suggestive,  indirect  evidence  that the dynamic  law and finance view adds explanatory  power  to
the law and finance  view.
C. Endowment  View
Data  on settler  mortality  is limited  and only exists  for countries  with British  and French  legal origins.
Thus,  we have  less than 30 observations  on market capitalization,  turnover,  outsider  rights, and accounting
standards. While  we provide  the results  on these  financial  institution  indicators  in the tables, we focus  our
discussion  on the four financial  institution  variables  with more  information:  PRIVATE  CREDIT,  LIQUID
LIABILITIES,  ENFORCE,  and PROPERTY  RIGHTS  with more  than 50 observations.
The Table 4a regressions  suggest  that settler  mortality  explains  a significant  amount  of the cross-country
variation  in financial  institutions  when  we do not control  for GDP  per capita. Settler  mortality  is significantly
these  are  reported  in  the  Appendix.35
correlated  with all four of the financial  institution  variables  with  more than 50 observations. In countries  that
had higher levels  of settler  mortality  when colonialists  arrived,  we observe  lower levels of financial  institution
development  today. But, in a reoccurring  pattem, the link between  settler  mortality  and ENFORCE  and
PROPERTY  RIGHTS  weakens  after controlling  for the level of economic  development.
When  not controlling  for GDP per capita,  the data continue  to indicate  a very important  role for settler
mortality  in explaining  the development  of financial  institutions  after including  dummy  variables  for sub-
Saharan  Africa and Latin America  (Table  4b). While  there is generally  a negative  relationship  between  the
development  of financial  institutions  and both  the sub-Saharan  Africa and Latin America  dummy  variables,
these regional  dummy  variables  do not alter  the findings  on the endowment  view. Settler  mortality  is negatively
and significantly  associated  with PRIVATE  CREDIT,  LIQUID  LIABILITIES,  and ENFORCE  at the 5 percent
significance  level and enters with a P-value  of 0.051  in the PROPERTY  RIGHTS  regression. Again  the data
suggest  that  higher levels  of settler mortality  hurt financial  institution  development  today.
Some  of these relationships  between  settler  mortality  and the development  of financial  institutions
become insignificant  after controlling  for the overall  economic  development.  Since the logarithm  of real GDP
per capita  enters significantly,  these findings  are consistent  with  the view that settler  mortality  is associated
broadly  with economic  and financial  development  but not independently  with  the development  of specific
features  of the legal system. As noted earlier,  we confirm  these findings  when using instrumental  variables  to
extract  the exogenous  component  of GDP per capita. Settler  mortality  frequently  does not explain  financial
development  beyond  its influence  on GDP capita.
Table  4c shows  that settler  mortality  is robustly  linked  with the development  of financial  institutions
after controlling  for trade openness  and the fraction  of years the country  has been independent  since 1776.
Higher  levels  of initial  settler  mortality  are negatively  associated  with financial  institutions  today. We continue
to find a strong,  negative  relationship  between  settler  mortality  and the development  of financial  institutions
after controlling  for religious  composition  and ethnic fractionalization  variables. Table 4d reports  these  results.
While  the religious  and ethnic diversity  variables  sometimes  enter  significantly,  including  these  variables  in the
regressions  does  not alter the findings  on settler  mortality. We obtain  the same  pattem of results  when36
controlling  for economic  development  as above:  settler mortality  loses its strong  independent  link with financial
development  when  controlling  for GDP  per capita.
It is not practical  to control  for the transplant  effect in assessing  the endowment  view. The resultant
sample  never includes  more  than 23 observations. For completeness,  Table 4e presents  these regressions. Even
with this small  sample,  we get the same pattern  of results.
In sum, cross-country  differences  in the mortality  rate of European  settlers as they landed in various
corners of the world  help explain  cross-country  differences  in the development  of financial  institutions  today
when we do not control  for the level of GDP per capita. The findings  are consistent  with  the arguments
advanced  by AJR: initial  settler  mortality  influenced  the creation  of initial  institutions  and these initial
institutions  have  had long-lasting  implications  for the development  of future institutions. These findings  hold
after controlling  for regional  dummy  variables,  trade openness,  the fraction  of years the country  has been
independent  since 1776,  ethnic  diversity,  religious  composition,  and the transplant  effect. The link between
settler  mortality  and contract  enforcement  and the protection  of property  rights weakens,  however,  when
controlling  for the current  level of economic  development.  Thus,  the data are consistent  with  the view that
settler  mortality  influences  a broad  range of institutions  associated  with economic  development,  but mortality  is
not narrowly  and  particularly  linked  with the development  of financial  institutions.
D.  Politics  and Finance View
The data suggest  that  there is a weak, fragile  link between  initial  political structure  and current  levels  of
financial  development  (Table  5). Initial  political structure  is positively  correlated  with financial  development  in
only 2 of the 18  regressions  at the 5 percent level. The number  of significant  coefficients  drops  to one if we
control  for the level of economic  development.  The R 2indicates  that the political structure  variable  explains
very little of the cross-country  variation  that exists in development  of financial  institutions.
When  using alternative  conditioning  information  sets, the regressions  continue  to illustrate  the absence
of a strong  relationship  between  political structure  and financial  development.  We find  the same  pattern  of
results  when including  dummy  variables  for sub-Saharan  Africa  and Latin America  (Table  5b), after controlling37
for trade  openness  and years of independence  since 1776  (Table  5c),  while controlling  for religious  composition
and ethnic  fractionalization  (Tables  5d), and after controlling  for the transplant  effect (Table  5e). 2f  Also,  we
find a very fragile  link between  the individual  political  structure  components  and financial  development  (Table
5f). This holds  for both initial and contemporaneous  measures  of political  structure  (see Appendix).
E.  Finance, Law, and Endowments
When  we include  both legal origin and settler  mortality  together  in the financial  development
regressions,  the results  are consistent  with theories  that stress the role of legal traditions. The sample  is much
smaller  and contains  less variability  than in the tests of the law and finance  view above because  settler  mortality
data is available  for a limited  number  of countries  and it is only available  for British  and French  legal origin
countries. Only the PRIVATE  CREDIT,  LIQUID  LIABILITIES,  ENFORCE,  and PROPERTY  RIGHTS
regressions  contain  more than 50 observations  in Table 6, and we only  discuss  these  in text. The results show
that French  legal origin countries  have significantly  lower  values of PRIVATE  CREDIT,  ENFORCE,  and
PROPERTY  RIGHTS  than British  legal origin  countries. These results  hold when  controlling  for real GDP  per
capita and settler  mortality.
Thus,  the data are consistent  with  the law and finance view:  countries  with  a British  common  law
tradition  tend to protect  private  property  more  rigorously,  enforce  contracts  more  efficiently,  and have better
developed  financial  intermediaries  than French  civil law countries. We also included  the political  structure
indicators  simultaneously  in these  regressions. The political structure  indicators  never entered  any of the
financial  development  regressions  significantly. Moreover,  as noted above, the legal origin variables  continue
to explain  cross-country  variation  in financial  institutional  development  when controlling  for an array  of
26 In  Pistor  et.  al.'s (2000)  study  of the  historical  evolution  of corporate  law,  they  argue  that  changes  in the  political
environment  did  not  substantively  alter  corporate  law  in Germany,  France,  and  England.  In Germany,  revision  occurred  in
1937  and  1965.  "While  the 1937  law  includes  language  reflecting  the  national-socialist  ideology,  the principles  of the law
were  not  altered  fundamentally  either  in 1937  or in 1965."  (p.56)  Similarly,  France  enacted  its  first  comprehensive
corporate  law  in 1867  during  the  reign  of  Napoleon  IH. Yet,  when  the  law  was  amended  100  years  later  during  a very
different  political  climate,  "... it was  not  substantially  revised."  (p.57)  Finally,  even  as  England's  Labour  governments
during  the  post-World  War  II era sought  far-reaching  nationalization,  England  did  not  dramatically  alter  its corporate  law.
As  Pistor,  et.  al.  (2000)  argue,  "...the  same  approach  to  corporate  lawmaking  survives  different  political  regimes."  (p. 58)38
political  structure  indicators. Thus, the data suggest  that differences  in legal heritage are important  in explaining
cross-country  differences  in the development  of financial  institutions.
In terms of settler mortality,  the results  are generally  consistent  with the endowment  view,  but the
relationship  between  settler  mortality  and financial  development  weakens  when  controlling  for GDP per capita.
Settler  mortality  is significantly  and negatively  associated  with PRIVATE  CREDIT  and LIQUID  LIABILITIES
even  after controlling  for overall  economic  development  and legal origin. Settler  mortality  is also negatively
and significantly  linked  with  ENFORCE  and PROPERTY  RIGHTS  when  controlling  for legal origin.27
Consistent  with results  reported  above,  however,  settler  mortality  does not remain  significantly  linked  with
PROPERTY  RIGHTS  and ENFORCE  when controlling  for economic  development  (the logarithm  of current
real per capital  GDP). Thus,  the data are consistent  with the view that settler  mortality  is closely associated  with
a range of factors  associated  with overall  economic  development  but less specifically  linked  with financial
institutions  than the legal origin  variables.
27 Controlling  for  political  structure  does  not  alter  these  findings  on settler  mortality  but  reduces  the  sample  even  further.39
VII. Conclusions
This  paper assessed  four theories  regarding  the historical  determinants  of financial  development.  The
law andfinance view emphasizes  that  different  legal traditions  protect  the rights of outside  investors  to differing
degrees. According  to this view a large  part of the cross-country  differences  in financial  development  can be
traced  back  to different  legal traditions  and their protection  of outsider  rights. The dynamic  law andfinance
view augments  the law and finance view by noting that legal traditions  differ in terms of their ability  to adapt  to
changing  conditions. Those  legal traditions  that are able to adapt can better foster  financial  development  than
more  rigid legal traditions. The politics andfinance view de-emphasizes  the role of legal traditions  and instead
emphasizes  that  political factors  shape  financial  development.  Finally,  the endowment  view stresses  that the rate
of settler  mortality  importantly  influenced  the types of institutions  that colonialists  established  and these initial
institutions  endured  with last implications  on economic  development.  Thus, when  initial  conditions  produced  an
unfavorable  environment  for European  settlers,  colonialists  tended to create institutions  designed  to extract
resources  expeditiously  and not to foster long-run  prosperity.
Our findings  are consistent  with  the law and finance  and dynamic  law and finance  views. Differences  in
legal origin  - whether  a country  has a British,  French, German,  or Scandinavian  legal heritage  - help explain the
development  of financial  institutions  today even after controlling  for the level of economic  development,
regional  dummy  variables,  religious  composition,  ethnic  diversity,  openness  to international  trade,  the fraction
of years the country  has been independent  since 1776,  the transplant  effect, initial  endowments,  and the political
environment.  Compared  to the other  legal families,  countries  with a French  legal tradition  tend to have  weak
financial  institutions.  They have  less transparent  corporate  financial  statements,  poorer  property  rights
protection,  weaker  protection  of the rights of shareholders  and debt holders,  and lower levels  of stock market
and bank development.  Common  law and German  civil laws have  comparatively  strong  financial  institutions.
Specifically,  common  law systems  tend to have particularly  strong  accounting  systems,  strong  protection  of the
rights of outside  investors,  and large equity  markets. In comparison,  German  civil law systems  tend to have
stronger  protection  of private  property,  effective  contract enforcement,  and well-developed  banks.40
This  paper also argues that  the dynamic  law and finance  view makes a worthwhile  amendment  to the
law and finance  view. The law and finance  view stresses  that the civil  law tradition  tends to support  the creation
of a powerful  State  and this powerful  State  then tends to protect  society's elite from competition  by limiting  free
financial  development.  Nevertheless,  we find  that the legal origin  variables  remain  significantly  correlated  with
financial  development  even after controlling  for the openness  and competitiveness  of the political  system. Thus,
there is an independent  link between  legal origin and financial  institutions  beyond proxies  for political  power.
This finding  is consistent  with  the dynamic  law and finance's emphasis  that the adaptability  and flexibility  of
legal systems  importantly  influences  financial  development.
Furthermore,  the dynamic  law and finance  view helps reconcile  the comparative  success  of German
legal origin  countries  relative  to French  legal origin  countries  by noting that German  legal scholars  explicitly
sought  to make  their legal system  more adaptable  than the French  system. Also, the dynamic  law  and finance
view helps explain  why France has  been more successful  than many French  legal origin countries  in creating  a
vibrant  financial  system  by noting that France  itself  has created  a more  dynamic,  adaptive  legal system  than that
originally  envisioned  during  the formation  of the Napoleonic  civil code.
The data also  provide qualified  support  for the application  of AJR's endowment  view to financial
institutions. Countries  with high levels  of settler  mortality  during  the earlier  stages of colonization  tend to have
substantially  lower  levels of financial  institution  development  today. These results  hold even after controlling
for regional  dummy  variables,  religious  composition,  ethnic  diversity, openness  to international  trade, the
fraction  of years the country  has been independent  since 1776,  political  structure,  and legal origin. The link
between  settler  mortality  and financial  development  weakens  substantially,  however,  when controlling  for GDP
per capita. Settler  mortality  is closely  linked  with GDP per capita,  which confirms  and extends  AJR's findings.
But, settler  mortality  does not enjoy  a strong,  independent  link with financial  development  beyond  its links with
overall  economic  development.
Finally,  political  structure  variables  do not explain much of the cross-country  variation  in measures  of
bank development,  financial  development  or laws that protect  outsider  rights. As emphasized  in the
introduction,  this does not imply  that  politics is unimportant  for the development  of financial  institutions.41
Indeed,  the law and finance  and endowment  views focus  heavily  on political forces. Furthermore,  Rajan  and
Zingales  (2000)  show that there are important  cases when  major  changes  in interest  group  power  alter the
political  landscape  and hence  national approaches  to financial  development.  This  paper's findings  simply
indicate  that  when we examine  the most extensive  array of measures  that  have been constructed  for the structure
of the political  environment,  these  proxies are not particularly  useful in explaining  cross-country  differences  in
financial  institutions  today.
Besides  these specific  findings,  this paper also sheds light on a fundamental  element  of economics:
exchange. Economies  differ substantially  in terms of the ability  of private  agents to write contracts  and make
transactions  confidently. This  paper argues  that legal systems  differ in terms of their abilities  to facilitate  private
exchanges  and in terms  of their ability  to adapt to support  new financial  and commercial  transactions.
The results  hold strategic  messages  for policymakers.  While  a country  cannot  change its legal origin,  it
can - albeit with considerable  effort - reform  its judicial system  by emphasizing  the rights of outside  investors,
by making  contract  enforcement  more efficient  and certain,  and by creating  a legal system  that more effectively
evolves  to support  changing  economic  conditions.42
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Number  of
Variable  name  Description  and  source  Observations
Financial  sector  development:
Private  credit  A broad  measure  of  financial  development,  specifically  a measure  of  savings  113
channeled  through  financial  intermediaries  to borrowers.  Calculated  as  the
value  of  credits  by  financial  intermediaries  to the  private  sector  divided  by
GDP. Source:  Financial  structures  database.'
Liquid  liabilities  Measures  the  overall  size  of  the  financial  intermediary  sector.  Calculated  108
as currency  plus  demand  and  interest-bearing  liabilities  of bank  and  nonbank
financial  intermediaries  divided  by  GDP. Source:  Financial  structures  database.1
Market  capitalization  A measure  of  stock  market  development.  Calculated  as  the  value  of  shares  51
listed  on  the  stock  exchange  divided  by  GDP. Source:  Financial  structures
database.  1
Turnover  A measure  of  the  liquidity  of  the  market  relative  to it's  size. Calculated  as  51
the  ratio  of  total  shares  traded  on  the  stock  market  exchange  to GDP  divided
by market  capitalization  (defined  above).  Source:  Financial  structures  database'
Outsider  rights  An  index  of  the  degree  to  which  legal  codes  of  the  country  protect  participants  45
in financial  markets.  Constructed  as  the  sum  of  Creditor  (degree  of  protection
of  claims  of secured  creditors  in  the  case  of  reorganization  or liquidation  of  a
company)  and  Anti-director  (degree  of  protection  of monetary  shareholder
rights).  Ranges  from  0-10. Source:  La  Porta,  Lopez-de-Silanes,  Schleifer,
and  Vishny  (1998).
Enforce  An  indicator  of  the  effectiveness  of  the  legal  system  in enforcing  contracts.  104
Calculated  as  the  average  of  variables  Conrisk  (assessment  or  the  risk  that
a government  will/can  modify  a contract  after  it has  been  signed)  and  Rule
of Law  (assessment  of  the  law  and  order  tradition  of  the  country).  Ranges
from  1-10. Source:  La  Porta,  Lopez-de-Silanes,  Schleifer,  and  Vishny  (1998)
and  Levine,  Loayza,  and  Beck  (2000).
Accounting  A measure  of accounting  standards,  specifically  the  comprehensiveness  39
of  companies  balance  sheets  and  income  statements.  Ranges  from  0-90.
Source:  Center  for Intemational  Financial  Analysis  and  Research  (CIFAR)
and  La  Porta,  Lopez-de-Silanes,  Schleifer,  and  Vishny  (1998).
Property  rights  An  index  of  the  degree  to  which  govemment  protects  and  enforces  laws  that  97
protect  private  property.  Ranges  from  1-5. Source:  La  Porta,  Lopez-de-Silanes,
Schleifer  and  Vishny  (1999).
Public  Ownership  Percentage  of  assets  of  the 10  largest  banks  in each  country  owned  by  78
the  govemment  as share  of the  total  assets  of these  banks.  Source:  La  Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes,  Schleifer,  and  Vishny  (2000).
Legal  origin  data:
British  Indicator  for English  common  law  tradition.  Source:  La  Porta,  Lopez-de-  138
Silanes,  Schleifer  and Vishny  (1999).
French  Indicator  for French  civil  law  tradition.  Source:  La  Porta,  Lopez-de-Silanes,  138
Schleifer  and  Vishny  (1999).
German  Indicator  for German  civil  law  tradition.  Source:  La  Porta,  Lopez-de-Silanes,  138
Schleifer  and  Vishny  (1999).Data  Appendix  (continued):
Number  of
Variable  name  Description  and  source  Observations
Initial  political  structure  data:
Autocracy  A measure  of  the  general  closedness  of  political  institutions  ranging  122
from  0 (open)  to 10  (closed).  Source:  Polity  Ill.
Executive  Comp.  Measures  extent  to  which  executives  are  chosen  through  competitive  122
elections.  Ranges  from  0 (non-competitive)  to 3 (competitive).  Source:
Polity  Ill.
Executive  Open.  Measures  the  opportunity  for non-elites  to attain  executive  office. Ranges  122
from  0 (closed)  to  4 (open).  Source:  Polity  Ill.
Nonelite  Measures  the  extent  to  which  non-elites  are  able  to  access  institutional  122
structures  for  political  structures.  Ranges  from  0 (closed)  to  5 (open).
Source:  Polity  Ill.
Principal  component  A linear  combination  of  two  measures  of  the  degree  of competitiveness  in  the  157
initial  political  structure  (autocracy  and  exec.  comp.)  and  two measures  of  open-
ness  of the  initial  political  structure  (exec.  open.  and  nonelite).  Weights  for  linear
combination  calculated  using  principal  components  factor  analysis.
Source:  Intemally  constructed  using  data  from  Polity  lIl.
Current  political  structure  data:
Legislative  Comp.  Index  measures  the  number  of parties  competing  in the  last  legislative  election  138
ranging  from  1 (non-competitive)  to 7 (competitive).  Source:  Beck,  Clarke,
Groff,  Keefer,  and  Walsh  (2000).
Executive  Comp.  Index  measures  the  number  of  parties  competing  in the  last  executive  election  138
ranging  from  1 (non-competitive)  to 7 (competitive).  Source:  Beck,  Clarke,
Groff,  Keefer,  and  Walsh  (2000).
Cohesion  Measures  party  dispersion  within  the  government.  Source:  Beck,  Clarke,  138
Groff,  Keefer,  and  Walsh  (2000).
Checks  A measure  of political  cohesion  that  takes  into  account  the  effectiveness  138
of  electoral  checks  on  government  decision  makers  or electoral  rules  that
influence  party  control  over  members.  Source:  Beck,  Clarke,  Groff,  Keefer,  and
Walsh  (2000).
Special  An  indicator  variable  that  equals  one  if either  the  chief  executive,  the  largest  138
government  party  or any  other  parties  in  the  governing  coalition  represent  a
special  interest  group. Source:  Beck,  Clarke,  Groff,  Keefer,  and  Walsh  (2000).
Narrow  A measure  of centralization.  Calculated  as  the  log  of  average  number  of  118
representatives  elected  by  each  electoral  district  in a country.
Source:  Beck,  Clarke,  Groff,  Keefer,  and  Walsh  (2000).
Principal  component  A linear  combination  of  two  measures  of the  degree  of  competitiveness  in  the  118
current  political  structure  (legis.  comp.  and  checks)  and  two measures  of  openness
of  the  current  political  structure  (special  and  narrow).  Weights  for linear
combination  calculated  using  principal  components  factor  analysis.
Source:  Intemally  constructed  using  data  from  Beck,  Clarke,  Groff,  Keefer,
and  Walsh  (2000).
Regional  data:
Afrca  Indicator  for sub-Sahara  African  country.  Source:  Easterly  and  Levine  (1997)  149
Latin  Indicator  for Latin  American  country.  Source:  Easterly  and  Levine  (1997)  149Data Appendix  (continued):
Number  of
Variable  name  Description  and source  Observations
Openness  and Independence  data:
Openness  Calculated  as exports  plus imports  divided  by GDP. Source:  La Porta,  122
Lopez-de-Silanes,  Schleifer,  and Vishny  (2000).
Independence  Calculated  as the percentage  of years since  1776  that a country  has been  139
independent. Source:  Easterly  and Levine (1997)
Cufture  data:
Catholic  Percentage  of population  that follows Catholic  religion. Ranges  from 0-100.  104
Source:  Easterly  and Levine (1997).
Muslim  Percentage  of population  that follows Muslim  religion. Ranges  from 0-100.  104
Source:  Easterly  and Levine (1997).
Other  religion  Percentage  of population  that follows  religion  other  than Catholic,  Muslim,  104
or Protestant. Ranges  from 0-100. Source:  Easterly  and Levine  (1997).
Ethnolinguistic  Fract.  Probability  that two randomly  selected  individuals  in a country  will speak  the  101
same language. Source:  Easterly  and Levine  (1997).
Transplant  data:
Transplant  effect  Calculated  as sum  of indicator  variables  for receptive-indirect  transplants,  48
unreceptive  direct  transplants,  and unreceptive  indirect  transplants. Source:
Berkowitz,  Pistor,  and Richard  (1999).
Initial  environment  data:
Settler  mortality  Log of rate  of settler  mortality. Source:  Acemoglu,  Johnson,  and  78
Robinson  (2000).
Economic  development  data:
Log  GDP per capita  Log of GDP per  capita expressed  in current US dollars  for period  133
1975-1995. Source:  World  Development  Indicators.
1  Data are available  on the intemet  at http://www.worldbank.org/research/projects/finstructureTable la:  Summary statistics for indicators of financial development
Private  Liquid  Market  Outsider  Property  Public
credit  liabilities  capitalization  Tumover  rights  Enforce  Accounting  Rights  Ownership
Mean  0.37  0.45  0.30  0.33  5.31  5.85  60.90  3.58  43.34
Median  0.27  0.39  0.17  0.24  5.00  5.21  64.00  3.00  38.07
Standard  Deviation  0.31  0.28  0.38  0.39  1.93  2.24  13.64  1.09  30.27
Maximum  1,63  1.58  2.14  2.12  9.00  10.00  83.00  5.00  100.00
Minimum  0.02  0.07  0.01  0.01  1.00  2.27  24.00  1.00  0.00
Observations  113  108  51  51  45  104  39  97  78
Variable  definitions  are given  in the  data appendix.
Table I b:  Correlation of indicators of financial development
Private  Liquid  Market  Outsider  Property  Public
credit  liabilities  capitalization  Tumover  rights  Enforce  Accounting  Rights  Ownership
Private  credit
Liquid  liabilities  0.758***
Market  capitalization  0.334**  0.545***
Turnover  0.521'**  0.453***  0.075
Outsider  rights  -0.031  0.038  0.436***  -0.154
Enforce  0.750-  0.573***  0.379***  0.328**  -0.140
Accounting  0.535***  0.276  0.581***  0.219  0.288*  0.578***
Property  Rights  0.630-  0.464***  0.347**  0.359**  -0.026  0.802***  0.528***
Public  Ownership  -0.509***  -0.295**  -0.562***  -0.004  -0.093  -0.388***  -0.598***  -0.508***
*, **,  and *** denote  significance  at the 10%,  5%, and 1% level  respectively.  Variable  definitions  are given  in the data appendix.Table 2a:  Summary statistics for explanatory variables
British  French  German  Settler  Latin  Catholic  Muslim  Other  Ethnoilnguistic  Transplant  Princ. Comp.  Princ. Comp.
legal origin  legal origin  legal origin  nortality  Africa  America  Trade  Independence  religion  religion  religion  fractionalization  Effect  CPS  IPS
Mean  0.38  0.64  0.04  4.66  0.31  0.22  117.30  0.34  37.54  18.35  28.27  0.33  0.60  0.00  0.00
Median  0.00  1.00  0.00  4.44  0.00  0.00  94.41  0.11  26.10  0.90  18.00  0.23  1.00  -0.11  -0.41
Standard Deviation  0.49  0.50  0.21  1.23  0.47  0.42  120.07  0.37  37.37  32.15  28.23  0.30  0.49  1.26  1.58
Maximum  1.00  1.00  1.00  7.99  1.00  1.00  999.69  1.00  97.30  99.40  98.50  0.89  1.00  3.54  2.53
Minimum  0.00  0.00  0.00  2.15  0.00  0.00  19.41  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.40  0.00  0.00  -2.37  -2.65
Observations  137  137  137  78  147  147  122  139  104  104  104  101  48  118  139
Variable  definitions are given In the data appendix.
Table 2b:  Correlation of explanatory variables
British  French  German  Settler  Latin  Catholic  Muslim  Other  EthnolingulstFc  Transplant  Princ. Comp.  Princ. Comp.
legal origin  legal origin  legal origin  mortatty  Africa  America  Trade  Independence  religion  religion  religion  fractionalization  effect  CPS  IPS
British  legal  origin
French legal  origin  -0.848  --
German legal origin  -0.167  -0.232---
Settler mortality  -0.219-  0.219-  N/A
Africa  0.038  0.075  -0.149-  0.609-  . . . . . . . .
Latn  America  -0.101  0.181-  -0.109  -0.144  -0.363...
Trade  0.226"  -0.199-  -0.040  -0.221  -0.178-  0.114
Independence  -0.343  ..  0.154  0.348--  -0.320-  -0.443-  0.178*  -0.210--
Catholic religion  -0.451---  0.540-  -0.005  -0.048  -0.176-  0.533-  -0.086  0.388-  ..
Muslim  religion  0.012  0.105  -0.134  0.217-  0.080  -0.308--  -0.070  40.319 . -0.497...
Other reigion  0.501--  -0.470...  0.113  -0.123  0.146  -0.274---  0.081  -0.122  -0.533-  -0.217--
Ethnollngulst  Irac.  0.282-'  -0.096  -0.201-  0.330-  0.560--  -0.264--  -0.104  -0.432..  -0.221--  0.201-  0.146
Transplant  effect  -0.024  0.370..  -0.209  0.594---  0.244-  0.389-  -0.028  -0.278-  0.054  0.348-  0.085  0.380---
Princ. Comp. CPS  0.269--  -0.455--  0.223-  -0.502-  -0.451--  0.002  0.151  0.331--  0.012  -0.359-  0.119  -0.242--  -0.654--
Princ. Comp. IPS  0.470-  -0.425--  -0.019  -0.236--  0.178-  -0.102  0.153  -0.412..  -0.194  -0.132  0.231-  0.251  -0.125  0.319-
*  and  - denote signifcance  at the 10%. 5%, and  1% level respectively. Variable  definitions  are given in the data appendix.Table 3a: Law and Finance
Log(real  per  British  French  German  F-Test
capita GDP)  legal  origin  legal  origin  legal  origin  for legal  origin  R
2 Observations
Private  Credit  -0.317G  -0.366G  0. 41 3 B,  10.240  0.350  113
0.014  0.004  0.042  0.000
0.141  0.031  G  -0.016G  0. 497 B,F  4.760  0.666  113
0.000  0.810  0.902  0.008  0.004
Liquid Liabilities  -0.025G  -0065G  0.509B'F  3.930  0.208  108
0.640  0.237  0.004  0.011
0.116  0.262G  0.222G  0.579  5.510  0.468  108
0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.002
Market  Capitalization  . 0.188  0.014  0.148  1.790  0.049  51
0.059  0.886  0Q153  0.163
0.146  0.468  0.260  0.234  4.760  0.238  51
0.008  0.002  0.133  0.035  0.006
Turnover  . -0.007  0.0 5 2G  0 .7 9 76F  3.280  0.478  51
0.918  -0.052  0.007  0.029
0.027  0.045G  0.007G  0. 813B.F  2.980  0.484  51
0.314  0.538  0.917  0.007  0.041
Outsider  rights  2.000F  -0.947B  0.400  13.180  0.498  45
0.000  0.078  0.512  0.000
-0.370  1.334F,  -1.564  -0.638B  12.440  0.546  45
0.033  0.032  0.001  0.307  0.000
Enforce  ,  3,915G  4.495G  -0. 627 B,  145.060  0.312  104
0.000  0.000  0.141  0.000
1.203  -0.902G  -1.398G  0094,F  7.700  0.765  99
0.000  0.003  0.000  0.644  0.000
Accounting  standards  4.333G  -22.8335.0  -9.600  9.860  0.478  39
0.347  0.000  0.028  0.000
5.031  2.341  -15.22  -6.362  12.590  0.610  39
0Q002  0.631  0.003  0.165  0.000
Property  rights  -1.116  -1.613BG  0.2 0 05F  71.490  0.227  96
0.000  -1.613  0.277  0.000
0.526  0.1 5 7F  -0.4 2 2B,G  0 .4 3 6 F  7.300  0.591  96
0.000  0.533  0.093  0.081  0.000
Public Ownership  . -5.761  9.769  -3.231  1.420  0.058  78
0.642  0.371  0.828  0.243
-12.032  -27.747  -15.445  -10.447  2.500  0.272  75
0.000  0.024  0.206  0.466  0.067
Superscripts  B, F, and G denote  that the coefficient  estimate is significantly  different  from  the British,  French,  or German  coefficient.
estimate,  respectively,  at the 95% confidence  level. P-values  are in italics. Variable  definitions  are  given in the data appendix.Table 3b: Law, Finance, and Regional Dummies
Log(real  per  British  French  German  F-Test  Africa  Latin
capita  GDP)  legal  origin  legal  origin  legal  origin  for legal  origin  Dummy  Dummy  R
2 Observations
Private  Credit  . -0.195  -0.215G  0.4 13B.F  5.140  -0.284  -0.166  0.490  113
0.143  0.107  0.044  0.002  0.000  0.002
0.134  0.05 3G  0.026G  0.4 9 3B,F  3.520  -0.056  -0.111  0.684  113
0.000  0.695  0.847  0.009  0.018  0.181  0.003
Liquid  Liabilities  0 117G  0.126G  0.5 095.F  3.750  -0.350  -0.230  0.460  108
0.052  0.052  0.004  0.013  0.000  0.000
0.084  0.275  0.274  0.560  8.860  -0.202  -0.192  0.551  108
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000
|Market  Capitalization  . 0.218  0.084  0.148  2.110  -0.047  -0.196  0.084  51
0.032  0.541  0.162  0.112  0.855  0.107
0.150  0.471  0.313  0.236  4.800  0.121  -0.151  0.269  51
0.007  0.002  0.120  0.037  0.006  0.579  0.152
Tumover  . 0.042  -0.024G  0.7 9 7 ",  3.020  -0.257  -0.048  0.508  51
0.530  0.653  0.008  0.040  0.000  0.489
0.012  0.062  -0. 0 0 5G  0.805"'  3.070  -0.244  -0.045  0.509  51
0.679  0.384  0.938  0.008  0.038  0.000  0.533
Outsider  rights  . 1.923  _1.000B  -0.400'  8.090  0.327  0.125  0.501  45
0.002  0.092  0.523  0.000  0.518  0.877
-0.398  1.351  -1.571  -0.656  9.120  -0.288  -0.096  0.547  45
0.054  0.038  0.014  0.310  0.000  0.680  0.905
Enforce  -2.7 50 G  -3.326  -0.62 7 '.F  24.410  -2.247  -1.497  0.485  103
0.000  0.000  0.145  0.000  0.000  0.002
1.217  -0.713G  -0.933G  0 1  0 3 F  4.030  -0.080  -1.063  0.800  99
0.000  0.009  0.002  0.614  0.010  0.812  0.000
Account  . -3.300  -18.900  -9.600  5.080  -6.200  -8.850  0.536  39
0.492  0.005  0.032  0.005  0.206  0.139
4.648  1.673  -13.175  -6.608  6.100  0.964  -5.902  0.632  39
0.022  0.741  0.015  0.164  0.002  0.800  0.349
Property  Rights  -0.637  -1.17 3B.G  0.2 00 B.F  16.470  -1.127  -0.482  0.398  96
0.021  0.000  0.282  0.000  0.000  0.063
0.477  0.176  -0.376'-  0 .414F  5.260  -0.286  -0.245  0.601  96
0.000  0.488  0.163  0.089  0.002  0.221  0.246
Public  Ownership  . -5.740  10.944  -3.231  1.170  0.467  -2.858  0.059  78
0.657  0.366  0.830  0.329  0.973  0.725
-15.232  -27.766  -15.520  -12.365  2.230  -25.756  -11.088  0.329  75
0.000  0.027  0.221  0.394  0.092  0.013  0.196
Superscripts  B,  F, and G denote  that  the coefficient  estimate  is significantly  different  from  the British,  French,  or German  coefficient
estimate,  respectively,  at the 95%  confidence  level. P-values  are in italics. Variable  definitions  are  given in the data  appendix.Table  3c:  Law,  Finance,  Openness,  and  Independence
Log(real  per  British  French  German  F-Test  Trade  Years  since
capita  GDP)  legal  origin  legal  origin  legal  origin  for legal  origin  Openness Independence  R
2 Observations
Private  Credit  . -0.225G  -0.322?  0 . 2 2 8 B.F  5.650  0.001  0.297  0.442  100
0.084  0.009  0.315  0.001  0.017  0.001
0.143  0.081  0.0149  0391F  2.810  0.000  0.072  0.670  100
0.000  0.546  0.914  0.062  0.044  0.700  0.248
Liquid  Liabilities  . -0.018  -0.056  0.373  1.380  0.001  0.087  0.250  95
*  0.744  0.263  0.119  0.254  0.049  0.194
0.117  0.237  0.219  0.505  4.530  0.000  -0.091  0.436  95
0.000  0.001  0.010  0.025  0.005  0.421  0.237
IMarket  Capitalizaton  0 .218F  -0.034'  0.053  2.790  0.001  0.148  0.465  46
*  0.012  0.394  0.709  0.053  0.000  0.076
0.078  0. 320F  0.102k  0.146  3.640  0.001  -0.025  0.512  46
0.006  0.002  0.131  0.335  0.021  0.000  0.808
Tumover  . 0.056  -0.0353  0.275  F  2.970  0.000  0.255  0.445  46
0.538  0.664  0.048  0.043  0.220  0.001
-0.021  0.028  -0.0720  0.25C(  2.970  0.000  0.300  0.452  46
0.542  0.755  0.496  0.087  0.044  0.118  0.018
Outsider  rights  1.679F  -0.709"  0.357  4.650  0.001  -1.004  0.510  41
*  0.018  0.221  0.608  0.008  0.554  0.218
-0.335  1.266F  -1.3258  -0.069  4.570  0.002  -0.218  0.532  41
0.209  0.062  0.064  0.932  0.009  0.092  0.851
Enforce  . -3.264F  -4.296"'3  1.790F  28.360  0.004  2.592  0.521  96
0.000  0.000  0.025  0.000  0.000  0.000
1.128  -0.917F  -1.629'G  -0.336F  7.860  0.000  0.435  0.766  92
0.000  0.005  0.000  0.327  0.000  0.732  0.354
Account  -3.082  -23 .670 B.G  -12.628F  7.020  0.022  7.866  0.541  35
0.549  0.001  0.042  0.001  0.015  0.361
5.313  2.813  -14.367B,G  -6,447  2.970  0.007  -2.295  0.630  35
0.000  0.584  0.031  0.298  0.044  0.314  0.772
Property  Rights  -0.876  -1.551B  -0.2 3 98F  21.440  0.003  1.192  0.485  86
0.025  0.000  0.539  0.000  0.000  0.000
0.417  -0.028  -0. 630B.G  0.274F  10.170  0.001  0.452  0.627  86
0.000  0.930  0.051  0.417  0.000  0.010  0.123
Public  Ownership  . -10.750  7.305  0.032  1.320  -0.085  -23.758  0.172  65
0.312  0.400  0.998  0.278  0.110  0.031
-13.529  -33.225  -22.803  -17.485  2.730  -0.024  2.595  0.335  63
0.000  0.010  0.129  0.315  0.052  0.533  0.846
Superscripts  B, F, and  G denote  that  the  coeffident  estimate  is significantly  different  from  the British,  French,  or German  coefficient
estimate,  respectively,  at the 95% confidence  level. P-values  are in italics. Variable  definitions  are  given  in the data  appendix.Table 3d: Law, Finance, and Culture
Log(real  per  F-Test  for  Catholic  Muslim  Other  F-Test  Ethnolinguistic
capita GDP)  legal  origin  Religion  Religion  Religion  for religion  Fractionalizabon  R
2 Observations
Private  Credit  . 3.900  -0.001  -0.002  0.000  0.900  -0.246  0.411  94
0.012  0.637  0.441  0.869  0.447  0.009
0.157  2.900  -0.001  0.001  0.001  1.380  -0.024  0.680  94
0.000  0.040  0.718  0.756  0.741  0.255  0.727
Liquid  Liabilities  . 1.690  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.480  -0.293  0.271  89
0.175  0.990  0.688  0.554  0.699  0.001
0.138  1.690  0.001  0.003  0.003  4.360  -0.119  0.546  89
0.000  0.176  0.635  0.027  0.155  0.007  0.110
IMarket  . 1.390  -0.001  -0.003  -0.001  0.620  0.076  0.072  50
Capitalization  . 0.258  0.725  0.374  0.676  0.603  0.720
0.215  1.840  0.002  0.004  0.002  0.750  0.404  0.307  50
0.009  0.156  0.730  0.432  0.536  0.526  0.088
Tumover  . 1.920  -0.003  -0.003  -0.002  0.470  0.032  0.413  50
0.141  0.437  0.332  0.556  0.705  0.841
0.050  1.840  -0.002  -0.001  -0.001  0.150  0.107  0.434  50
0.141  0.155  0.547  0.634  0.705  0.927  0.526
Outsider  rights  . 6.570  -0.003  0.017  0.009  2.530  0.678  0.584  44
0.001  0.844  0.131  0.424  0.073  0.440
-0.195  6.190  -0.007  0.011  0.004  1.300  0.118  0.590  44
0.459  0.002  0.615  0.421  0.748  0.291  0.922
Enforce  . 4.730  -0.005  -0.019  -0.007  2.880  -2.461  0.438  89
0.004  0.762  0.207  0.660  0.041  0.001
1.333  3.560  0.005  0.006  0.005  0.150  0.225  0.770  89
0.000  0.018  0.658  0.551  0.621  0.927  0.663
Account  . 2.700  -0.045  -0.175  -0.057  0.720  3.779  0.526  38
0.063  0.770  0.276  0.590  0.550  0.678
7.834  1.690  0.095  0.059  0.115  0.740  23.047  0.695  38
0.000  0.192  0.462  0.651  0.240  0.539  0.021
Property  Rights  . 20.010  -0.001  -0.003  -0.002  0.160  -0.967  0.316  93
0.000  0.908  0.724  0.732  0.923  0.005
0.547  5.420  0.003  0.007  0.003  0.860  -0.102  0.636  93
0.000  0.002  0.642  0.223  0.609  0.467  0.735
Public  Ownership  . 2.580  0.678  0.878  0.618  4.020  -1.996  0.194  65
0.062  0.019  0.002  0.034  0.012  0.895
-14.610  1.750  0.221  0.286  0.223  0.390  -34.158  0.376  65
0.000  0.168  0.409  0.301  0.413  a757  0.007
P-values  are in italics. Variable  definitions  are  given in the data appendix.Table 3e: Law, Finance,  and the Transplant Effect
Log (Real  British  French  German  F-Test  Transplant
GDP per Capita)  Legal Origin  Legal Origin  Legal Origin  for legal origin  Effect  R
2 Observations
Private Credit  0.006'  0 .04 1G  0.452  B  3.93  -0.355  0.527  47
0.971  0.805  0.027  0.015  0.001
0.182  0.114G  -0.034  0.435  4.08  0.017  0.641  47
0.000  0.439  0.083  0.030  0.0126  0.895
Liluid  Liabilities  . 0.133G  0.1 1 1 G  0. 5 2 6 B,F  5.08  -0.183  0.374  44
0.012  0.138  0.003  0.005  0.025
0.121  0.206  0.115G  0.5 1 4F  7.000  0.067  0.450  44
0.011  0.001  0.119  0.005  0.0007  0.637
Market Capitalization  . 0.270F  -0.030'  0.162  4.220  -0.042  0.236  45
0.001  0.717  0.158  0.011  0.634
0.209  0.385F  _0.018B  0.146  7.200  0.374  0.465  45
0.002  0.000  0.806  0.191  0.001  0.028
Tumover  *  0.013'  -0.051G  0 . 7 8 7 ,F  2.880  0.030  0.473  45
0.895  0.637  0.007  0.048  0.804
0.083  0.058G  -0.047G  0.781"'  3.23  0.195  0.492  45
0.120  0.483  0.661  0.007  0.033  0.319
Oubider rights  1.3 7 5F,G  -1.787B  -0.825s  16.28  1.063  0.557  45
0.017  0.002  0.212  0.000  0.012
-0.114  1.308  F.  -1.790B  -0.804  14.93  0.826  0.558  45
0.693  0.031  0.003  0.232  0.000  0.238
Enforce  . -1.011  -0.708  0.411 B  3.300  -3.170  0.677  48
0.012  0.066  0.276  0.029  0.000
1.294  -0.237  -0.661  0.290F  2.340  -0.526  0.838  48
0.000  0.459  0.038  0.218  0.087  0.316
Account  . 0.258 s  -15.691'Bb  -5.927'F  7.440  -9.182  0.565  39
0.956  0.003  0.216  0.0006  0.002
4.825  2 .360F.G  - 1 5 .0 7 6 B,G  -6.260"'  9.070  -0.586  0.610  39
0.108  0.632  0.005  0.180  0.000  0.916
Property Rights  . -0.054  -0.164  0.447  1.770  -0.983  0.491  46
0.847  0.603  0.131  0.167  0.000
0.417  0.183  -0.173'  0.454  2.48  -0.109  0.605  46
0.000  0.521  0.579  0.115  0.075  0.724
PublicOwnership  . -14.754  -6.127  -3.837  0.650  25.342  0.22  48
0.213  0.613  0.774  0.585  0.004
-13.013  -22.536  -6.607  -2.622  2.130  -1.240  0.321  48
0.031  0.062  0.587  0.851  0.110  0.931
Superscripts B, F, and G denote that the coefficient estimate is significantly different from the British, French, or German coefficient
estimate, respectively, at the 95%  confidence level.  P-values are in italics.  Variable definitions are given in the data appendix.Table 3?: Law,  Components of Initlal Political  Structure, and Finance
F-est  tor  Exec.  Exac.  Prindpal
legal  origin  Auto-racy  Comp.  Open  Nonelte  Comp.  R
2
Observations
Prvate Credit  10.521  0.011  . . . 0.370  103
0.000  0.147
9.864  . 0.017  . . 0.359  103
0.000  . 0.516
10.707  .0.021  . . 0.366  103
0.000  . . 0.232
10.111  0.010  0.359  103
0.000  0.593
10.546  . . . . 0.010  0.359  103
0.000  . . . . s58
UquidLiabioties  5.151  0.011  . - 0.290  98
0.002  0.116
4.462  . 0.005  0.272  98
0.006  . 0.847
4.943  . -0.030  0.295  98
0.003  . . 0.083
4.737  0.  .003  . 0.272  98
0.004  . . . 0.874
5.356  .- 0.018 0.281  98
0.002  0.  . . e194
Market  1.485  0.001  . . . . 0.049  51
Capitatlalon  0.23f  0.922
1.347  . 0.022  . . 0.050  51
0.271  0.613
0.867  0  . 0.017  0.052  51
0.465  . . 0.541
1.404  . . . 0.006  . 0.049  51
0.254  . . . 0821
1.094  . . . 0.009  0.050  51
0.361  0.  . . a702
Turnover  3.267  -0.002  . 0.478  SI
0.030  0.901 
3.106  . -0.017  . . 0.479  51
0.039  . e 785
3.278  . 0.005  . . 0.478  sI
0.039  . 0892
3.518  . 0.025  . 0.466  51
0.022  . 0.496
3.208  . . 0.007  0.479  51
0.032  0.  . . e852
Outsider  Rights  10.846  0.131  0.  . . 543  45
0e000  0.098
1ss6  . -0.418  . . 0.530  45
0.000  . 0.110
9.443  . -0.016  . . 0.498  45
0ooo  . . 0936
12.755  . . . -0.149  . 0.10  45
0.000  . . .306
10.655  . . . -0.232 0.526  49
0.000  . . . . a148
Enforce  97.008  0.078  . . . . 0.324  11
0.000  0.11  .
137.667  . 0.054  0.314  101
0.000  . 0.  774
68.096  . -0.235  . . 0.333  101
0.000  . . 0.075
76.165  . . . 0.251  0.336  101
0000  0  . . .039
132.505  -0.079  0.315  101
0.000  . . . . e498
Accounting  9.160  -0.323  . . 0.483  39
standards  0.000  0.510
6.918  . 2.082  . . . 0.493  39
0.001  . 0.233
9.441  . 1.503  . . 0.500  39
0.000  . . 0.240
9.572  . . . 0.782  . 0.483  39
0.000  . . 0.469
8.836  . . . 1.165  0.494  39
0.000  . . . 0.216
Propert  Rights  43.957  0e037  . . . . 0238  92
0000  0213
.698  -0.024  . 0.227  92
0.000  . .a30
45.127  . . -0.103  0.242  92
0.000  . . 0.182
47.165  . . . 0.083  . 0.236  92
0.000  . . . 0.212
o8.116  -0.0s  0.229  92
0.000  . . . . 0.529
Public  1.541  -0.038  . 0.062  77
ownership  0.211  0.700
0.614  . -2.685  . . . 0.066  77
0.608  . 0.524
1.607  . 0.759  0.062  77
0.0s  . . 0.74
1.304  . . . -1.304  0.064  77
0.280  . . 0.607
1.203  . . . -0.310 0.061  77
0a315  . . . . 0.893
P-values  ar  in Italtis.  Variable  definlttons  are  given  in the  data  appendibTable 3g: Law, Current Political Structure, and Finance
Current  poiitical  structure
F-test  for  Legis.  Exec.  Principal
legal  origin  Comp.  Comp.  Cohesion  Checks  Special  Narrow  Comp.  RF  Obs.
Private  Credit  8.213  0.060  . . . . . . 0.465  113
0.000  0.000
7.503  . 0.064  . . . . . 0.487  113
0.000  . 0.000
9.569  . . 0.143  . . . . 0.415  113
0.000  . . 0.002
9.424  . . . 0.071  . . . 0.427  113
0.000  . . . 0.001
9.055  . . . . 0.057  . . 0.354  113
0.000  . . . . 0.462
8.916  . . . . . 0.021  . 0.357  99
0.000  . . . . . 0.352
5.746  . . . . . . 0.099  0.470  99
0.001  . . . . . . 0.000
Liquid  Liabilities  3.394  0.054  . . . . . . 0.321  108
0.021  0.000  . . .
3.352  . 0.053  . . . . . 0.322  108
0.022  . 0.000
5.772  . . 0.138  . . . . 0.280  108
0.001  . . 0.001
3.883  . . . 0.069  . . . 0.298  108
0.011  . . . o000
3.706  . . . . 0.185  . . 0.259  108
0.014  . . . . 0.010
3.144  . . . . . 0.034  . 0.184  95
0.029  . . . . . 0.173
3.091  . . . . . . 0.099  0.318  95
0.031  . . . . . . 0.000
Market  2.119  0.037  . . . . . . 0.064  51
Capitalization  0.111  0.342
2.178  . 0.038  . . . . . 0.069  51
0.103  . 0.292
2.035  . . 0.025  . . . . 0.050  51
0.122  . 0.676  . .
2.273  . . . 0.038  . . . 0.066  51
0.093  . . . 0.268
2.287  . . . . 0.189  . . 0.078  51
0.091  . . . . 0.333  .
1.866  . . . . . 0.057  . 0.081  48
0.150  0.  . . . 323
2.103  . . . . . . 0.051  0.072  48
0.114  . . . . . . 0.364Table  3g (continued):  Law,  Current  Political  Structure,  and Finance
Current  political  structure
F-test  for  Legis.  Exec.  Principal
legal  origin  Comp.  Comp.  Cohesion  Checks  Special  Narrow  Comp.  R
2 Obs.
Turnover  3.141  -0.015  . . . . . 0.481  51
0.034  0.773
2.932  . -0.009  . . . . . 0.479  51
0.043  . 0.823
3.827  . . 0.082  . . . . 0.494  51
0.016  . . 0.377
3.343  . . . 0.057  . . . 0.518  51
0.027  . . . 0.156
3.774  . . . . 0.233  . 0.521  51
0.167  . . . . 0.113
2.690  . . . . . 0.012  . 0.400  48
0.058  . . . . . 0.736
3.101  . . . . . . 0.097  0.515  48
0.036  . . . . . . 0.018
Outsider  Rights  13.652  -0.371  . . . . . . 0.553  45
0.000  0.039
14.775  . -0.395  . . . . . 0.570  45
0.000  . 0.008
13.620  . . -0.633  . . . . 0.541  45
0.000  . . 0.046
19.274  . . . -0.426  . . . 0.595  45
0.000  . . . 0.000
13.208  -0.507  0.507  45
0.000  ,  . . . 0.336
11.707  . . . . . 0.097  . 0.483355  42
0.000  . . . . . 0.570
20.054  . . . . . . -0.726  0.631  42
0.000  . . . . . 0.000
Enforce  39.824  0.662  . . . . 0.541  104
0.000  0.000
32.534  . 0.652  . . . . . 0.559  104
0.000  . 0.000
11.653  . . 1.483  . . . . 0.437  104
0.000  . . 0.000
17.827  . . . 0.743  . . . 0.467  104
0ooo  . . . o000
64.804  . . . . 0.078  . . 0.312  104
0000  . . . 0.887
87.440  . . . . -0.001  . 0.306  93
0.000  . . . . . 0.997
10.803  . . . . . . 1.038  0.556  93
0.000  . . . . . . 0.000Table 3g (continued): Law, Current Political Structure, and Finance
Current  politfcal  structure
F-test  for  Legis.  Exec.  Principal
legal  origin  Comp.  Comp.  Cohesion  Checks  Special  Narow  Comp.  R
2 Obs.
Accounting  9.825  2.064  . . . . . . 0.513  39
standards  0.000  0.053
9.619  . 2.005  . . . . . 0.503  39
0.000  . 0.125
3.211  . . 2.354  . . . . 0.490  39
0.001  . . 0.350
8.903  . . . 1.765  . . . 0.515  39
0.000  . . . 0.064
9.980  . . . . 5.884  . . 0.500  39
0.000  . . . . 0.141
9.937  . . . . . -2.301  . 0.520  36
0.000  . . . . . 0.030
8.566  . . . . . . 2.946  0.527  36
0.003  . . . . . . 0.047
Property  Rights  33.853  0.176  . . . . . 0.294  96
0.000  0.021
28.949  . 0.022  . . . . . 0.347  96
0.000  0.001  O
18.238  . . 0.461  . . . . 0.280  96
o.o0  . . 0.005
18.086  . . . 0.190  . . . 0.268  96
0.000  . 0.015
59.156  . . 0.127  . . 0.229  96
0.000  . . . . 0.694
53.542  . . . . . -0.083  . 0.245  87
0.000  . . . . . 0.391
10.817  . . . . . . 0.325  0.350  87
0.000  . 0.000
Public  1.251  -2.629  . . . . . . 0.082  78
ownership  0.298  0.196
0.977  . -3.188  . . . . . 0.094  78
0.408  . 0.100
1.310  . . -2.681  . . . . 0.060  78
0.278  . . 0.625
1.020  . . . -2.820  . . . 0.072  78
0.389  . . . 0.210
1.531  . . . . 10.203  . . 0.075  78
0.214  . . . . 0.270
2.191  . . . . . -0.151  . 0.076  68
0.098  . . . . . Q968
0.866  . . . . . . -5.091  0.106  68
0.463  . . . . . . 0.136
P-values  are In italics. Variable  definitfons  are  given in the data  appendix.Table 4a: Initial Environment  and Finance
Log  (Real
GDP  per  Capita)  Settler  mortality  R2  Observations
Private  Credit  -0.112  0.372  68
0.000
0.106  -0.048  0.591  68
0.000  0.006
Liquid  Liabilities  -0.118  0.383  65
0.000
0.050  -0.088  0.429  65
0.002  0.000
Market  Capitalization  -0.171  0.344  26
0.008
0.058  -0.137  0.371  26
0.187  0.052
Tuumover  -0.055  0.165  26
0.001
0.029  -0.038  0.197  26
0.399  0.150
Outsider  rights  -0.266  0.025  22
0.415
-0.898  -0.894  0.198  22
0.035  0.184
Enforce  -0.688  0.251  65
0.000
0.995  -0.085  0.566  63
0.000  0.517
Accounting  standards  -6.749  0.267  18
0.144
4.576  -3.984  0.319  18
0.284  0.477
Property  rights  -0.404  0.241  60
0.000
0.513  -0.053  0.457  59
0.000  0.646
Public  Ownership  9.614  0.107  40
0.045
-18.993  -3.670  0.440  39
0.000  0.373
P-values  are  in italics. Variable  definitions  are  given  in  the data  appendix.Table 4b: Initial Environment,  Finance,  and Regional  Dummies
Log  (Real  SetUer
GDP  per  Capita)  mortality  Africa  dummy  Latin  dummy  R 2 Observations
Private  Credit  . -0.101  -0.067  -0.094  0.398  68
0.001  0.397  0.134
0.124  -0.042  -0.010  -0.135  0.668  68
0.000  0.055  0.856  0.003
Liquid  Liabilites  . -0.085  -0.158  -0.158  0.450  65
0.003  0.027  0.023
0.060  -0.057  -0.129  -0.176  0.511  65
0.005  0.028  0.032  0.009
|Market  Capitalition  . -0.249  0.611  0.000  0.590  26
0.000  0.000  0.999
0.042  -0.214  0.559  -0.043  0.602  26
0.419  0.000  0.000  0.707
Tumover  . -0.041  -0.120  0.008  0.213  26
0.058  0.164  0.921
0.042  -0.006  -0.171  -0.034  0.265  26
0.236  0.782  0.001  0.629
Outsider  rights  . -0.085  0.576  -2.705  0.491  22
0.657  0.357  0.004
-0.572  -0.540  0.758  -2.351  0.555  22
0.057  0.046  0.192  0.010
Enforce  . -0.580  -0.636  -0.885  0.284  64
0.006  0.303  0.096
1.119  -0.093  0.008  -1.124  0.665  63
0.000  0.561  0.987  0.001
Acocount  . -6.610  13.540  -10.691  0.504  18
0.123  0.399  0.317
5.601  -3.032  13.299  -11.868  0.581  18
0.135  0.263  0.299  0.207
Property  Rights  . -0.278  -0.524  -0.272  0.261  60
0.051  0.142  0.328
0.551  0.083  -0.523  -0.507  0.496  59
0.000  0.497  0.069  0.017
Public  Ownership  . 17.650  -41.261  -17.229  0.241  40
0.001  0.010  0.112
-19.258  1.113  -28.880  -1.904  0.526  39
0.000  0.785  0.013  0.821
P-values  are  in italics. Variable  definitions  are  given  in the  data  appendix.Table 4c: Initial  Environment,  Finance, Openness,  and Independence
Log(real  per  Settler  Trade  Years  since
capita GDP)  mortality  Openness  Independence  R
2 Observations
Private  Credit  -0.102  0.000  0.014  0.443  68
0.000  0.017  0.872
0.103  -0.054  0.000  -0.064  0.604  68
0.000  0.006  0.685  0.296
Liquid Liabilities  . -0.127  0.000  -0.213  0.573  65
0.000  0.091  0.003
0.040  -0.109  0.000  -0.240  0.597  65
0.038  0.000  0.278  0.001
Market  Capitaliation  . -0.144  0.001  -0.045  0.619  26
0.015  0.000  0.744
0.035  -0.130  0.001  -0.115  0.625  26
0.417  0.044  0.000  0.495
Tumover  . -0.042  0.000  0.172  0.259  26
0.019  0.359  0.160
0.000  -0.042  0.000  0.172  0.259  26
0.998  0.089  0.286  0.168
Outsider  rights  . -0.400  0.000  -4.583  0.512  22
0.124  0.813  0.002
-0.206  -0.514  0.000  -4.155  0.517  22
0.648  0.156  0.853  0.018
Enforce  . -0.585  0.003  0.314  0.305  64
0.005  0.000  0.645
1.022  -0.124  0.000  -0.549  0.575  63
0.000  0.397  0.806  0.305
Account  . -6.126  0.015  -15.523  0.417  18
0.087  0.212  0.264
9.119  -1.193  -0.005  -30.039  0.560  18
0.025  0.679  0.557  0.015
Property  Rights  . -0.305  0.002  0.276  0.330  59
0.012  0.000  0.503
0.487  -0.073  0.001  -0.288  0.484  59
0.000  0.525  0.133  0.457
Public  Ownership  . 7.561  -0.058  -7.466  0.156  39
0.131  0.169  0.646
-22.100  -4.483  0.008  22.950  0.486  39
0.000  0.235  0.773  0.086
P-values  are in italics. Variable  definitions  are given in the data appendix.Table  4d: Initial  Environment,  Finance,  and  Culture
Log(real  per  SeWer  Catholic  Muslim  Other  F-Test  Ethnolinguistic
capita GDP)  mortality  Religion  Religion  Religion  for religion  Fractionalization  R  Observations
Private  Credit  . -0.106  -0.003  -0.003  -0.001  2.450  -0.052  0.454  60
o0.000  0.156  0.189  0.614  0.074  0.458
0.127  -0.039  -0.001  0.000  0.001  5.070  -0.014  0.662  60
0.000  0.051  0.504  0.745  0.548  0.004  0.818
Liquid Liabilities  . -0.116  -0.001  0.000  0.001  1.530  -0.059  0.447  57
o0.000  0.337  0.966  0.743  0.218  0.428
0.071  -0.078  0.000  0.002  0.002  3.660  -0.058  0.505  57
0.004  0.004  0.914  0.256  0.216  0.018  0.377
IMarket  Capitalization  . -0.177  -0.003  -0.004  -0.001  1.440  0.399  0.545  26
0.002  0.366  0.311  0.875  0.262  0.083
0.107  -0.128  -0.001  0.000  0.002  0.940  0.405  0.595  26
0.262  0.049  0.754  0.987  0.791  0.439  0.116
Tumover  . -0.063  0.002  0.000  0.001  1.750  0.108  0.275  26
0.003  0.354  0.868  0.652  0.190  0.402
0.022  -0.053  0.002  0.001  0.002  0.670  0.109  0.284  26
0.634  0.116  0.259  0.628  0.485  0.581  0.383
Outsider  rights  . -0.414  -0.017  0.014  0.009  5.260  2.574  0.635  22
0.038  0.376  0.297  0.56s  0.010  0.027
-0.057  -0.435  -0.019  0.011  0.006  3.310  2.480  0.635  22
0.855  0.072  0.412  0.554  0.757  0.049  0.055
Enforce  . -0.607  -0.025  -0.025  -0.010  2.470  -0.512  0.332  57
0.004  0.098  0.078  0.618  0.072  0.509
1.233  0.008  -0.005  0.005  0.016  4.420  0.165  0.653  57
0.000  0.961  0.695  0.689  0.314  0.008  0.768
Account  . -4.724  -0.285  -0.368  -0.182  0.620  19.592  0.572  18
0.306  0.237  0.224  0.535  0.616  0.340
10.060  -1.096  0.032  0.008  0.167  0.320  33.187  0.711  18
0.009  0.757  0.870  0.972  0.397  0.811  0.076
Property  Rights  . -0.365  -0.012  -0.006  -0.005  2.520  -0.386  0.302  60
o0.001  0.096  0.411  0.562  0.067  0.367
0.636  -0.012  -0.003  0.008  0.005  4.790  -0.070  0.571  59
0.000  0.911  0.665  0.176  0.456  0.005  0.843
Public  Ownership  . 5.117  1.050  1.204  1.225  3.400  -15.018  0.328  38
0.364  0.006  0.003  0.014  0.030  0.471
-20.680  -2.105  0.287  0.284  0.437  0.810  -40.560  0.579  38
0.000  0.639  0.362  0.395  0.194  0.497  0.009
P-values  are in italics. Variable  definitions  are  given in the data appendix.Table 4e: Initial Environment, Finance,  and the Transplant Effect
Log (Real  Settler  Transplant
GDP per Capita)  mortality  Effect  R2  Observations
Private  Credit  -0.122  -0.267  0.551  23
0.047  0.207
0.094  -0.088  -0.114  0.615  23
0.061  0.102  0.593
Liquid  Liabilities  -0.113  0.004  0.339  21
0.116  0.979
0.022  -0.105  0.040  0.345  21
0.699  0.118  0.852
IMarket  Capitalization  -0.234  0.252  0.387  21
0.090  0.341
0.128  -0.192  0.460  0.460  21
0.109  0.148  0.143
Tumover  -0.037  -0.037  0.105  21
0.168  a0703
0.030  -0.027  0.011  0.125  21
0.606  0.453  0.930
Outsider  rights  -0.393  0.647  0.035  22
0.444  0.556
-1.128  -0.817  -1.222  0.223  22
0.055  0.217  0.492
Enforce  -0.660  -2.815  0.720  23
0.005  0.000
0.806  -0.362  -1.515  0.826  23
0.007  0.014  0.033
Account  -4.194  -12.85  0.34  18
0.421  0.191
2.165  -3.477  -9.878  0.348  18
0.681  0.522  0.441
Property  Rights  -0.242  -1.122  0.554  22
0.091  0.004
0.291  -0.134  -0.654  0.625  22
0.104  0.292  0.169
Public  Ownership  5.905  34.446  0.366  23
0.354  0.040
-14.092  0.696  11.714  0.503  23
0.025  0.910  0.470
P-values  are in italics. Variable  definitions  are given  in the data appendix.Table 5a: Initial political  structure  and Finance
Log  (Real  PC  for Initial
GDP  per  Capita)  Political  Structure  R 2 Observations
Private  Credit  . -0.006  0.001  103
0.789
0.165  -0.002  0.548  103
0.000  0.888
Liquid  Liabilities  . -0.011  0.001  98
0.557
0.118  -0.009  0.403  98
0.000  0.590
Market  Capitalization  . 0.034  0.024  51
*  0.149
0.113  0.042  0.166  51
0.005  0.065
Turnover  . 0.007  0.001  51
0.830
0.079  0.013  0.067  51
0.035  0.694
Outsider  rights  . 0.289  0.068  45
0.066
-0.408  0.274  0.141  45
0.058  0.075
Enforce  . -0.012  0.000  101
0.942
1.351  -0.033  0.752  96
0.000  0.649
Accounting  standards  . 2.761  0.133  39
0.022
6.627  2.878  0.421  39
0.000  0.007
Property  rights  . 0.029  0.002  92
0.696
0.562  0.054  0.534  92
0.000  0.274
Public  Ownership  . -2.179  0.013  77
0.318
-10.557  -1.739  0.216  74
0.000  0.374
P-values  are  in italics.  Variable  definitions  are  given  in the  data  appendix.Table 5b: Initial political  structure,  Finance,  and Regional  Dummies
Log (Real  PC for Initial
GDP per Capita)  Political Structure  Africa dummy  Latin dummy  R2  Observations
Private Credit  0.003  -0.397  -0.314  0.330  103
0.879  0.000  0.000
0.148  -0.005  -0.081  0.174  0.587  103
0.000  0.770  0.087  0.000
Liquid Liabilities  -0.004  -0.367  -0.304  0.408  98
0.812  0.000  0.000
0.078  -0.007  -0.197  -0.227  0.510  98
0.000  0.631  0.000  0.000
|Market Capitalization  0.035  -0.025  -0.222  0.077  51
0.125  0.922  0.006
0.115  0.040  0.143  -0.155  0.207  51
0.005  0.081  0.543  0.020
Tumover  0.015  -0.380  -0.196  0.095  51
0.636  0.000  0.044
0.054  0.017  -0.301  -0.165  0.122  51
0.153  0.588  0.000  0.078
Outsider rights  0.177  1.661  -1.107  0.185  45
0.261  0.002  0.135
-0.428  0.176  0.875  -1.471  0.248  45
0.098  0.259  0.285  0.061
Enforce  -0.001  -2.848  -2.339  0.353  100
0.995  0.000  0.000
1.330  -0.080  -0.035  -1.207  0.801  96
0.000  0.226  0.923  0.000
Account  2.300  -3.628  -17.227  0.393  39
0.055  0.488  0.000
5.574  2.334  5.828  -11.850  0.552  39
0.006  0.028  0.177  0.019
Property Rights  0.065  -1.364  -0.907  0.306  92
0.319  0.000  0.000
0.493  0.053  -0.338  -0.448  0.559  92
0.000  0.293  0.169  0.036
Public Ownership  -2.033  -1.550  4.030  0.017  77
0.377  0.900  0.572
-13.720  -1.287  -27.784  -7.860  0.275  74
0.000  0.523  0.004  0.299
P-values are in italics. Variable definitions are given in the data appendix.Table 5c: Initial political structure, Finance,  Openness,  and Independence
Log(real  per  PC for Initial  Trade  Years  since
capita GDP)  Political  Structure  Openness  Independence  R2  Observations
Private  Credit  . 0.016  0.001  0.421  0.342  91
0.453  0.000  0.000
0.151  -0.014  0.000  0.067  0.627  91
0.000  0.381  0.019  0.309
Liquid Liabilities  . -0.013  0.001  0.187  0.260  86
0.499  0.000  0.010
0.101  -0.033  0.001  -0.047  0.458  86
0.000  0.083  0.001  0.524
|Market Capitalization  0.039  0.001  0.118  0.375  46
0.062  0.000  0.179
0.058  0.030  0.001  -0.032  0.408  46
0.038  0.150  0.000  0.780
Tumover  . 0.023  0.000  0.334  0.294  46
0.217  0.085  0.000
-0.011  0.024  0.000  0.364  0.297  46
0.758  0.249  0.129  0.020
Outsider  rights  . -0.058  0.002  -2.611  0.267  41
0.696  0.100  0.001
-0.026  -0.052  0.002  -2.540  0.267  41
0.915  0.752  0.055  0.004
Enforce  . 0.225  0.008  3.231  0.320  93
0.162  0.000  0.000
1.341  -0.053  0.001  -0.199  0.746  89
0.000  0.575  0.559  0.702
Account  . 3.668  0.035  9.563  0.230  35
0.087  0.012  0.380
7.555  2.454  0.010  -6.688  0.479  35
0.000  0.154  0.309  0.475
Property  Rights  . 0.168  0.004  1.537  0.329  82
0.027  0.002  0.000
0.498  0.052  0.001  0.251  0.563  82
0.000  0.337  0.030  0.468
Public  Ownership  . -3.882  -0.090  -24.669  0.141  65
0.114  0.071  0.028
-10.657  -0.612  -0.040  3.375  0.262  63
0.005  0.791  0.302  0.807
P-values  are in italics. Variable  definitions  are given  in the data appendix.Table 5d: Initial political  structure,  Finance, and Culture
Log(real  per  PC for Inifial  Catholic  Muslim  Other  F-Test  Ethnoling.
capita GDP)  Pol. Struct.  Religion  Religion  Religion  for religion  Frac.  R
2 Observations
Private  Credit  . -0.008  -0.004  -0.004  -0.001  3.670  -0.376  0.216  90
0.757  0.014  0.010  0.557  0.015  0.000
0.180  -0.013  -0.001  0.001  0.002  2.280  -0.046  0.591  90
0.000  0.484  0.536  0.605  0.342  0.086  0.533
Liquid  Liabilities  . -0.005  -0.001  0.000  0.002  1.510  -0.380  0.193  85
0.806  0.386  0.750  0.236  0.217  0.000
0.142  -0.007  0.002  0.004  0.004  6.690  -0.147  0.550  85
0.000  0.667  0.061  0.000  0.003  0.000  0.037
|Market  Capitaliation  . 0.024  0.000  -0.002  0.001  0.790  0.089  0.050  50
0.297  0.887  0.354  0.690  0.508  0.706
0.216  0.037  0.003  0.005  0.004  1.750  0.427  0.294  50
0.005  0.083  0.326  0.100  0.061  0.172  0.098
Tumover  . 0.018  -0.001  -0.002  0.000  0.960  -0.160  0.070  50
0.587  0.394  0.224  0.997  0.419  0.250
0.088  0.024  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.430  -0.021  0.139  50
0.110  0.489  0.863  0.614  0.404  0.731  0.898
Outsider  rights  . 0.113  -0.017  0.009  0.010  3.830  1.997  0.428  44
0.402  0.042  0.415  0.301  0.017  0.038
-0.037  0.117  -0.017  0.008  0.010  3.740  1.894  0.428  44
0.897  0.428  0.064  0.547  0.402  0.019  0.139
Enforce  . -0.031  -0.033  -0.044  -0.025  15.120  -2.934  0.371  86
0.816  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.000
1.441  -0.085  -0.012  -0.008  -0.005  3.290  0.483  0.780  86
0.000  0.250  0.004  0.126  0.313  0.025  0.348
Account  . 1.566  -0.255  -0.335  -0.116  7.920  8.890  0.472  38
0.120  0.000  0.009  0.054  0.000  0.256
7.891  0.973  -0.126  -0.119  -0.005  3.470  25.532  0.664  38
0.000  0.282  0.017  0.193  0.931  0.028  0.002
Property  Rights  . 0.027  -0.013  -0.013  -0.007  5.810  -1.202  0.213  89
0.697  0.000  0.003  0.049  0.001  0.001
0.579  0.017  -0.004  0.002  0.002  2.580  -0.061  0.607  89
0.000  0.741  0.147  0.685  0.516  0.059  0.848
Public  Ownership  . 0.346  0.165  0.406  0.086  2.530  -8.471  0.126  65
0.880  0.249  0.018  0.669  0.066  0.581
-15.645  0.774  -0.147  -0.070  -0.157  0.480  -43.461  0.347  65
0.000  0.687  0.348  0.717  0.423  0.695  0.001
P-values  are in italics. Variable  definitions  are given  in the data appendix.Table  5e:  Initial  political  structure,  Finance,  and  the  Transplant  effect
Log (Real  PC for Initial  Transplant
GDP per Capita) Political Structure  Effect  R2  Observations
Private Credit  . -0.014  -0.438  0.350  47
0.626  0.000
0.184  0.007  -0.051  0.478  47
0.000  0.813  0.715
Liquid Liabilities  . -0.024  -0.225  0.149  44
0.395  0.016
0.117  -0.011  0.023  0.229  44
0.026  0.704  0.882
IMarket  Capitalization  . 0.047  -0.060  0.098  45
0.082  0.482
0.164  0.063  0.278  0.251  45
0.019  0.025  0.162
Tumover  0.012  -0.101  0.020  45
0.698  0.371
0.133  0.026  0.174  0.073  45
0.142  0.446  0.465
Outsider rights  0.317  0.679  0.098  45
0.056  0.260
-0.611  0.240  -0.636  0.149  45
0.158  0.186  0.596
Enforce  -0.204  -3.561  0.660  48
0.082  0.000
1.235  -0.064  -0.961  0.821  48
0.000  0.427  0.087
Account  2.205  -13.849  0.388  39
0.043  0.000
4.673  2.635  -5.196  0.432  39
0.139  0.028  0.439
Property  Rights  -0.026  -1.133  0.454  46
0.583  0.000
0.365  0.014  -0.359  0.549  46
0.003  0.767  0.264
Public Ownership  -0.813  23.573  0.189  48
0.711  0.002
-9.572  -1.899  3.420  0.250  48
0.008  0.363  0.809
P-values are in italics. Variable definitions are given in the data appendix.=  0  S~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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Log(real per  French  Settler
capita GDP)  legal origin  mortality  R2 Observations
Private Credit  . -0.090  -0.104  0.412  68
0.038  0.000
0.103  -0.075  -0.043  0.618  68
0.000  0.022  0.011
Liquid Liabilities  . -0.060  -0.113  0.400  65
0.208  0.000
0.048  -0.053  -0.085  0.442  65
0.004  0.252  0.001
|Market Capitalization  . -0.206  -0.139  0.419  26
0.033  0.005
0.072  -0.227  -0.094  0.442  26
0.142  0.012  0.069
Tumover  . 0.039  -0.061  0.177  26
0.548  0.000
0.027  0.031  -0.044  0.205  26
0.428  0.613  0.049
Outsider rights  . -2.772  0.132  0.451  22
0.001  0.491
-0.703  -2.564  -0.390  0.556  22
0.009  0.001  0.031
Enforce  . -0.866  -0.623  0.31  65
0.030  0.000
1.010  -0.875  -0.014  0.629  63
0.000  0.004  0.924
Account  . -23.330  -3.026  0.718  18
0.000  0.000
4.231  -23.140  -0.499  0.762  18
0.047  0.000  0.691
Property Rights  . -0.546  -0.331  0.292  59
0.022  0.001
0.521  -0.571  0.003  0.539  59
0.000  0.002  0.974
Public Ownership  . 1.976  9.289  0.108  40
0.861  0.068
-19.542  6.346  -5.072  0.449  39
0.000  0.365  0.208
P-values are in italics. Variable definitions are given in the data appendix.Policy  Research Working  Paper  Series
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